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INTRODUCTION

We begin with a proposed definition of Enronitis:
Enronitis. (n., neologism derived from Enron, a large
company that went bankrupt amid allegations of
market manipulation, phony accounting, looting, and
other corporate misbehavior)
1. A malfunction of corporate governance in which
top managers become extraordinarily wealthy while
misleading shareholders, creditors, employees and
the general public about the company's prospects and
practices, eventually resulting in share price
collapse, loss of jobs, and, in extreme cases, the
corporation's bankruptcy.
Thought to have
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characterized a non-trivial portion of the American
corporate economy in the "bubble economy" around
the turn of the twenty-first century.
Often
accompanied by sudden collapse of the reputations of
seemingly upstanding corporate citizens who turn
out to have been routinely lying, not only to
shareholders, but to their own board members,
employees, tax authorities, etc.
The Enron problem is widely understood to be the result
of too weak of a legal mandate supporting the share-centered

paradigm of corporate law. Paradoxically, however, it is in
fact the predictable result of too strong of a share-centered
view of the public corporation; share-centered corporate law
creates the very problems it is meant to police.1 The singlevalued profit maximization ethos of the share-centered
corporation demands that managers teach themselves to
exploit everyone around them. It is inevitable that some will
learn this lesson so well that they will exploit even those for
whose benefit they are supposed to be exploiting.
Corporate law demands that managers simultaneously be
selfless servants and selfish masters. On the one hand, it
directs managers to be faithful agents, setting aside their
own interests entirely in order to act only on behalf of their
principals, the shares. On the other hand, in the service of
this extreme altruism, they must ruthlessly exploit everyone
around them, projecting on to the shares an extreme
selfishness that takes no account of any interests but the
shares themselves. Having maximally exploited their fellow
human corporate participants, managers are then expected
to selflessly hand over their gains, ill and justly gotten, to the
' Much confusion in our law results from the unfortunate fact that we
use the same term to refer to public corporations and closely held ones. In
closely held corporations, a controlling shareholder (or small group of
shareholders) has most of the rights of an "owner" in the normal sense of
the word; in public corporations, shareholders have such rights only in
potential, and the potential is only as real as the takeover market is free,
uninhibited and vibrant. This Article discusses only public corporations;
most of its analytic framework is inapplicable to firms with human
owners.
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faceless legal abstraction of the fictional shareholder.
Altruism and rationally self-interested exploitation are
extreme and radically opposed positions, psychologically and
politically. The managerial role is deeply unstable and
unlikely to hold.
For managers, one easy resolution of these tensions is a
simple, cynical selfishness in which managers see
themselves as entitled, and perhaps even required, to exploit
shareholders as ruthlessly as they understand the law to
require them to exploit everyone else.
Another likely
resolution conveniently switches between market and
fiduciary norms to allow managers to view themselves-in
good faith-as underpaid and exploited even as they increase
their pay to previously unheard of levels. Enronitis, thus, is
the result of the very share-centered paradigm current
reform seeks to strengthen.
The damage caused by the share-centered paradigm goes
beyond the share-manager conflict, however.
On the
simplest level, the share-centered paradigm encourages
managers to see their job as requiring them to ignore all
political, moral and human values but one: profit. This view
urges managers to see the world in purely instrumental
terms. However, this makes managers, who perform their
roles as we tell them to, into one-sided, anti-social outsiders
to civil society. Citizens do not treat fellow citizens as mere
strangers and tools. Our corporate law, paradoxically, tells
managers that to be good managers they must be bad
citizens.
Internally, the share-centered paradigm is just as selfdestructive.
Corporations succeed because they are not
markets and do not follow market norms of behavior.
Rather, they operate under fiduciary norms as a matter of
law and team norms as a matter of sociology. However, the
share-centered paradigm of corporate law teaches managers
to treat employees as outsiders and tools to corporate ends
with no intrinsic value. Just as managers are unlikely to
learn simultaneously to be selfish maximizers and selfless
altruists, they are unlikely to be simultaneously cooperative
team players and self-interested defectors. Thus, the share-
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centered view undermines the prerequisite to operating the
firm in the interests of shareholders. Share-centeredness
can both accentuate the pathologies of teams-especially the
tendency to disregard the interests of non-team members in
an excess of we/them competitiveness-and undermine the
mutual solidarity that is vital to maintain the team's
advantages.
A story about Enron's CEO Jeffrey Skilling epitomizes the
problem so well it seems too good to be true:
As a [Harvard Business School] student, Jeffrey
Skilling was asked what he would do if his company
were producing a product that might cause harm-or
even death-to the customers that used it..
Skilling replied, "I'd keep making and selling the
product. My job as a businessman is to be a profit
center and to maximize return to the shareholders.
It's the government's job to step in if a product is
dangerous. 2
Skilling's statement foreshadows both the internal
corporate law and external regulatory perversities of
Enronitis. On the one hand, even as a student Skilling had
fully internalized the share-centered view that role morality
requires managers to ignore ordinary responsibility for their
fellows in favor of pursuit of profit. On the other hand, the
extraordinary distortions that view creates (even within its
own narrow framework) are already apparent: how likely is
it that murdering your customers could be profit
maximizing?
What is needed is a new paradigm for understanding
corporate law, one that emphasizes the collective, corporate
nature of the public corporation without falling into the trap
of assuming that easy professionalism can resolve difficult
value choices. Corporations are governance structures as
complex as any other and deserve to be analyzed as such.
Reforms emanating from a new understanding of the public
2 PETER

C. FusARo & Ross M.

MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON:

EVERYONE'S GUIDE TO THE LARGEST BANKmuPrcY IN U.S. HISTORY

28 (2002).
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corporation as polis are more likely to ameliorate the
dangers of Enronitis and other corporate dysfunctions.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews a few of
the recent scandals and some of the reforms proposed in
response. Part III sets out the basic theoretical framework of
the share-centered corporation and the fictional shareholder
as applied to the problem of managerial incentives and
loyalty: managers are directed to work for fictional
shareholders who are, in turn, imagined to have no
relationships with the rest of us. The law teaches managers
to act as if they were fiduciaries for foreigners interested
only in using us and our world, not as fellow citizens in a
common enterprise. Instead of acting as the representatives
of a major part of our collective governance system, they are
told to treat us much as a not-too-benevolent colonial power
might, as tools for a stranger's projects.
Part IV applies and expands this framework in the
contexts of both internal corporate law and external
regulatory law. First, corporate law creates an oasis of
agency or fiduciary law using norms appropriate to coadventurers, within a greater environment of disinterested
arm's-length market relations. The fictional shareholder is
an unsatisfactory partner or principal in the fiduciary oasis
because it is incapable of the loyalty or mutuality such
relationships demand. The usual attempt to rescue the
special relationship with shares is a metaphor of ownership;
because the fictional shareholders "own" the firm they are
entitled to special consideration and rights as the end, rather
than the means, of the corporate enterprise. This metaphor,
however, is not powerful enough to do the work demanded of
it in the share-centered corporation. Shares do not have
enough of the usual attributes of ownership to plausibly
appear (or demand treatment as) corporate ends. Moreover,
even though shareholders are sometimes (and incorrectly)
called "owners," they are simultaneously viewed as factors of
production like all other means to corporate ends.
Second, managerial attempts to resolve the tensions of
the share-centered view can lead to a series of corporate
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malfunctions in addition to corporate betrayal of
shareholders:
" corporate decisions to treat regulatory and
criminal law as merely prudential, additional
elements to be taken into calculation in making a
profit-maximization decision;
" ever-increasing managerial pay; and
" distortions of the team spirit that drives
corporations as sociological entities.
Part V briefly considers some of the proposed reforms
intended to strengthen the share-centered framework. It
concludes that, although they are likely to be helpful in
preventing a repeat of the current scandals, any reform that
leaves the basic incentive structure in place is likely to result
in corporate managers finding new, creative, and unexpected
routes to scandal.
Finally, Part VI outlines a new conceptual frameworkcorporation as polis-that would allow us to think of
corporate managers as explicitly political participants in an
explicitly political conflict over public values and private
money. The dominant share-centered view seeks to pretend
corporations are apolitical by claiming that values, safety,
and citizenship are, as Skilling said, "the government's job."'
Its historic opponent, benevolent managerialism, is equally
obfuscatory, pretending that professional ethics will suffice
to resolve genuine value conflicts. Corporation as polis, in
contrast, seeks to frankly acknowledge the multiple value
conflicts inherent in any corporate enterprise. By taking the
corporation seriously as a locus of both value debate and
interest group conflict over scarce resources, we will be
better able to tie our most powerful economic engines to
private wealth generation, social good, and the public
interest.

3Id.
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II. THE PROBLEM: CORPORATE FAILURE
We live in an age of corporate scandal. Publicly traded
corporations are the core of our economy, essential building
blocks of our society, and centers of our individual and
collective lives. They provide nearly half of our nongovernmental jobs4 and probably account for an even larger
portion of our GNP.5 The largest operate on every continent;6
a new form of empire on which "the sun never sets."7 We
work for them, buy from them, listen to them, depend on
them and glorify them. Yet we seem unable to control them
Our major corporations violate law and
satisfactorily.
civility on a routine basis.
Often we sharply distinguish two types of corporate
scandal. On the one hand are scandals of corporate law
4 Of the 110 million Americans employed by private industry in 1999,
just under half were employed by enterprises with 500 or more employees.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 483
No. 716 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/
02statab/ business.pdf [hereinafter 2002 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. Although
the abstract was silent on this point, it seems safe to assume that virtually
all these large private employers are publicly traded corporations.
' Precisely what portion of the economy is comprised of publicly traded
firms turns out to be surprisingly difficult to determine. That it is large is
clear: total stock market capitalization on the New York Stock Exchange
alone is roughly $15 trillion. Press Release, New York Stock Exchange,
Barclays Global Investors and the New York Stock Exchange Introduce
New Exchange Traded Funds Based on NYSE Indexes (April 2, 2004),
available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1080904515942.html. However, it
is hard to find numbers comparable to the total economy. In 2002,
corporate business as a whole (including closely-held private corporations)
accounted for $6.2 trillion, or about sixty percent of the $10.4 trillion GDP
that year. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L
INCOME AND PROD. ACCOUNTS tbls. 1.1.5 and 1.14, available at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp.
6 In 1999, non-bank multinational corporations alone accounted for
roughly fifteen percent of our economy: 21.3 million U.S. jobs and gross
U.S. product of $1.8 trillion. Compare 2002 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 4, at 497 No. 749 (multinationals) with id. at 393 No. 602 (stating
that total non-farm U.S. employment was about 132 million in 2001) and
id. at 834 No. 1320 (U.S. GDP in 1999 was $9.2 trillion).
7 JOHANN CHRISTOPH FRIEDRICH VON SCHILLER, DON CARLOS act 1,
sc. 6.
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proper, in which internal corporate law norms are violated.
Generally, these involve managers who help themselves
instead of the corporation, or help themselves at the expense
of the corporation. In a familiar pattern, stock prices rise
and then collapse based on information that later turns out
to be false or distorted, managers get rich, the company goes
bankrupt, employees lose their jobs and pensions, and
customers and suppliers must struggle to pick up the pieces
in disrupted markets. In the aftermath of the late 1990s
stock market rise, one giant company after another (along
with plenty of small ones) had stock price collapses,
allegations of shady accounting or dishonest managers,
questions raised about directors asleep at the wheel or
managers paid enormous sums while profits disappeared.8
8

According to a General Accounting Office ("GAO," now called the

Government Accountability Office) study, 845 listed companies restated
their financial results to correct previous material misrepresentations
between January 1997 and June 2002. This is an extraordinary admission
of wrongdoing by 9.95% of the total number of companies listed on the

NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ.
STATEMENT

RESTATEMENTS:

RESPONSES,

AND REMAINING

available

at

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL
TRENDS,

MARKET

IMPACTS,

REGULATORY

GAO 03-138, 15-18 (2002),
[hereinafter
http://www.gao.gov/news-items/d03138.pdf
CHALLENGES,

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE].

The GAO study period includes the

dot-com boom as well as part of the clean-up period afterwards. Booms
typically allow some companies to grow out of lies and make concealment
of the remaining problems easier. Accordingly, it is safe to assume that
the study understates the true extent of the problem. See John C. Coffee,
UnderstandingEnron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW.
1403 (2002) (suggesting that restatements are an indication that earlier
earnings management had gotten out of hand); see also GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra, at 43 (quoting Sept. 1998 speech by then-SEC
Chair Arthur Levitt raising concerns about degeneration in quality of
reported earnings).
Under the Securities and Exchange Act regimes, companies have
affirmative obligations to disclose financial statements that are not
materially misleading. For example, Section 11 of the Securities Act
imposes liability for untrue statements of a material fact in a registration
Section 10(b) of the
statement without any scienter requirement.
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder make unlawful "any untrue
statement of a material fact. . . in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." Form 10-K requires various officers to certify that annual
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The second, often more important, type are the regulatory
scandals, in which corporations take actions that harm those
around them in violation of regulatory law or societal norms
that ought to restrain predatory or negligent behavior.
These include corporations that produce dangerous products
either without adequate testing or in the face of known
safety concerns, such as asbestos, tobacco, 1-tryptophan,
ephedra, the Ford Pinto exploding gas tank, or SUVs. They
include abuse of the environment by routine pollution in
large or small scale, from global warming to low mileage, and
environmental disasters classified as accidents, such as
Bhopal or Exxon Valdez.
They include human rights
violations, such as Enron's alleged complicity in police
suppression of dissidence in connection with its Dabhol
project,9 or Unocal's alleged benefitting from slave labor on
its Yadana gas pipeline in Burma."0 Of most importance to
this Article, the regulatory scandals include numerous
instances where corporate managers felt constrained to do
things they knew were wrong because of their belief that
they were obligated to pursue profit at all costs.
Corporate law scandals, my central focus here, are
generally understood to be failures of the corporate profit
reports contain no untrue statements of material fact or material
omissions. Each of these and other disclosure obligations has various
additional requirements before liability can be established, so the
restatements reported in the GAO report are not admissions of legal
liability. But there can be no question that each one reflects a failure to
fulfill the intent of the law and a company's fiduciary obligation to deal
with its shareholders honestly.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ENRON CORPORATION: CORPORATE
COMPLICITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 1 (1999) available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enronl.
The Enron Dabhol project is
discussed infra note 37.
10 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 0057195, 2002 WL 31063976, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (partially
reversing the district court's dismissal of claims under the Alien Tort
Claims Act arising from allegations that Unocal benefited from forced
labor, murder, rape, and torture in constructing the Yadana gasline). See
also HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORTS, available at http://www.
hrw.org/worldreport99/special/corporations.html and http://www.hrw.org/
wr2kl/special/corporations3.html (summarizing allegations).

ENRONITIS
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norm, thought to occur when managers put their own gain
Regulatory
ahead of the corporation's best interests.
scandals, in contrast, are generally understood as resulting
from too strong a pursuit of profit, thought to occur when the
corporation has put its profit ahead of law, morality, safety,
the environment, or the social good.
The distinction between corporate law scandals and
regulatory scandals is overdrawn. As we shall see, corporate
law scandals stem from the same underlying weaknesses in
corporate law and organization as regulatory scandals.
Therefore, paradoxical though it may seem, corporate law
reforms that seek to tame self-interested managers by
increasing the power of the share-centered profit norm
ultimately will exacerbate the problem rather than solve it.
As managers teach themselves to treat the law, morality,
and fellow citizens as mere costs of doing business, some will
learn this lesson so well that they will exploit even those for
whose benefit they are supposed to be exploiting.
A. Enron and Enronitis
Perhaps the best known of the turn of the century
corporate law scandals is Enron.1 1 In the 1990s, Enron was
held up as a model of the new economy, deeply involved in
the deregulatory agenda and symbolizing the efficiency of
markets in enriching itself and those around it. 12 The

" See, e.g.,

BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GuYs IN

THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003);

MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF

(2003); ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO,
(2003).
See, e.g., MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 11; Malcolm Gladwell, The

THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON

AND THE DEATH OF ENRON
12

Talent Myth: Are Smart People Overrated?,NEW YORKER, July 22, 2002, at

28 (critiquing a McKinsey & Co. study concluding that Enron was a model
of the new business built on the "war for talent" and an "open market for
hiring"); RICHARD N. FORSTER & SARAH KAPLAN, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION

150 (2001) (celebrating the Enron system: "[wie hire very smart people and
we pay them more than they think they are worth"); GARY HAMEL,
LEADING THE REVOLUTION (2000) (lauding Enron as a revolution in the way

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2004

company by stock market
nation's seventh-largest
capitalization, it was run by pillars of respectability,
charitable and political leaders, and friends of the
President. 3 Suddenly, seemingly overnight, it collapsed
amid disclosures of off-balance sheet transactions that
created hundreds of millions of dollars of reported income
that apparently never existed in fact.1" Its bankruptcy was
the second largest in U.S. history, 5 taking with it 10,000 jobs
and over $1 billion in its employees' retirement savings. 6 In
the last year before the collapse, meanwhile, its two senior
managers sold Enron stock worth over $150 million.17
Enron's economic innovations, praised one day in the
business press, became headline examples of fraud and
excess the next. Two years of investigations have led to a
series 'of indictments, guilty pleas and multi-million dollar
As I write, the
No doubt more will follow.
fines.'"
businesses are run); James Surowiecki, Drexel 2.0, NEW YORKER, Dec. 17,
2001, at 39.
" See, e.g., McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 11; Gladwell, supra note 12;
FORSTER & KAPLAN, supranote 12; HAMEL, supra note 12.
" See, e.g., Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, 24 Days: Behind
Enron's Demise-How Confusing EarningsFigures and a FortuitousBreak
Helped the Journal Uncover the Fraud,WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2003, at C1.
" Jeffrey Toobin, Annals of Law: End Run at Enron, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 27, 2003, at 48.
16 Id.
CEO Kenneth Lay managed to lose most of this money in
" Id.
Enron's collapse. See id. This does not change the fact that he had
succeeded in paying himself this much in the first place. Moreover, he was
encouraging other Enron employees to hold on to their stock even as he
was selling his own. Id.
" Inter alia, CEO Kenneth Lay, famous for his political connections,
was targeted for investigation and possible indictment. His successor,
Jeffrey Skilling, was indicted in February 2003. CFO Andrew Fastow and
his wife pled guilty to criminal charges, accepting ten year and six month
prison sentences and a $23 million forfeiture; three Merrill Lynch
employees were indicted in connection with transactions that apparently
allowed Enron to improve the appearance of its financial statements;
Merrill Lynch settled criminal charges with an acknowledgment that its
employees may have violated federal criminal law, former Enron treasurer
Ben Glisan pleaded guilty to criminal charges for concealing Enron's losses
in a "special purpose vehicle," and Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase
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investigation has not reached all the top executives and
prosecutors have said nothing public about the company's
use of its political connections during its heyday or after.
If Exxon's Valdez,' 9 Ford's Pinto," the asbestos
bankruptcies and the tobacco industry symbolize corporate
accepted fines of roughly $120 million and $200 million in SEC civil
proceedings for assisting Enron and another company in reporting
borrowed funds as if they were earned income. See United States v.
Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex., filed Jan. 14, 2004), available at
http://news.fmdlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usafastowll404 plea.pdf (guilty
plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one
count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, discussed in
Fastows Enter Guilty Pleas over Roles in Enron FinancialFraud, 36 SEC.
REG & L. REP. 123 (Jan. 19, 2004)); Toobin, supra note 15 (incorrectly
stating that, in the end, no crime may have been committed in a company
characterized by a "culture of dishonesty"); United States v. Bayly, Cr. No.
available at
2002),
Oct.
31,
Tex.,
filed
(S.D.
H-02-0665
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usbaylyetal9l603ind.pdf
(indictment and settlement agreement with Merrill, Sept. 16-17, 2003);
United States v. Glisan, Cr. No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex., filed on Sept. 10,
2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usglisan
91003plea.pdf (settlement agreement and statement); In the Matter of
Citigroup, Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-11192, 2003 SEC LEXIS
1778 (July 28, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/sec/
secciti72803ord.html; SEC v. J.P. Morgan Chase, Cr. No. H-03-38-77 (S.D.
Tex., filed July 28, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
sec/secjpmorgan72803cmp.html. On-line legal database Findlaw lists over
twenty-five different complaints, reports, indictments and plea agreements
as of February 2004. Enron has filed a 275-page complaint against several
investment banks, alleging that they actively participated in its officers'
use of special purpose entities to defraud the company and its
shareholders. Enron Corp. v. Citigroup Inc., Cr. No. B 01-16034 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Sept. 24, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
enron/eciti92403advprcd.pdf.
'9 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which
organized the Exxon Valdez clean-up effort and has monitored the damage
for the last decade, has a website devoted to the spill at
A five-page
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/spotlightspotlight.html.
bibliography of legal writings on the incident and its aftermath appears at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/bibliojlegal.pdf.
o Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (civil suit,
reversing jury award of astronomical punitive damages); State of Indiana
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-431 (March 10, 1980) (criminal case); Gary T.
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abuse of customers and other outsiders, Enron stands for the
same lack of concern for corporate shareholders and
employees. Other corporate law scandals followed the Enron
model closely. In Tyco, for example, the company showed its
willingness to go to extraordinary lengths to avoid its civic
responsibilities, even reincorporating in a foreign tax haven
to avoid corporate income taxes.2'
Its collapse was
precipitated by the discovery that its CEO had been evading
state sales taxes as well.22 This disclosure was followed
rapidly by allegations that top managers had been using
corporate assets for personal expenses and that reported
profits were non-existent. CEO Dennis Kozlowski was
charged with stealing $400 million from the company.23 In
Adelphia, the CEO and controlling shareholders are accused

Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013
(1991); Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977, at 18
(the muckraking article that created the scandal).
21 Rahm Emanuel, The Democrats Can Win on Taxes, WALL ST. J., Oct.
15, 2003, at A20 (reporting that Tyco avoided $400 million in U.S. taxes in
three years by reincorporating in Bermuda).
22 Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Ex-Tyco Chief Evaded $1 Million
in Taxes on Art, Indictment Says, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002, at Al.
23 Kozlowski
and his CFO Mark Swartz are being criminally
prosecuted in New York's Supreme Court for looting the company; Tyco is
suing Kozlowski civilly to attempt to reclaim some of the lootings; and the
SEC has brought an enforcement action. The defendants have denied
wrongdoing. People v. Kozlowski, No. 5259/02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Sept.
12,
2002),
available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/tyco/
nykozlowski9l2O2ind.pdf; SEC v. Kozlowski, No. 02 Civ. 7312 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Sept. 12 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
sec/uskowzlowski91202cmp.pdf. Videos, shown at the New York criminal
trial, of his apartment with its famous company-paid $6000 shower
curtain and a $2 million birthday party for his wife, have become internet
smash hits. See, e.g., Kevin McCoy, Jury Sees Kozlowski's Posh Digs Via
Video, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2003, at 2B. Kozlowski, like the central
figures of so many recent scandals, had been a hero of the business press.
A 1999 cover story in Barron's called him "the next Jack Welch." Jonathan
R. Laing, Tyco's Titan: How Dennis Kozlowski Is Creating a Lean,
Profitable Giant, BARRON'S, Apr. 12, 1999, at 27, 32. For a lengthy profile
of Kozlowski, see James B. Stewart, Where Did Tyco's Money Go?, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 17, 2003, at 132.
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of looting the company for personal interests. 4 Nine billion
dollars of WorldCom's reported profits turned out to be nonexistent; the result of simple accounting fraud and
manipulation known to many members of its internal
accounting department,2 5 although its top executives' $100
million in gains was real enough.26 HealthSouth allegedly
cooked its books to the tune of $2.7 billion.27
In other instances, corporate executives appeared to be
bringing to life the old joke about trading a million-dollar cat
for a million-dollar dog. Major telecommunications firms and
internet start-ups sold "capacity" and bought essentially
identical capacity back or sold expensive advertisements,
24

In re Adelphia Communications Corp., No. 02-41729 (REG), 2004

WL 2186582, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004) (detailing history of
investigation and lawsuit).
25 See Dennis Bereford, et al., Report of Investigation by the Special
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of WorldCom, Inc., Mar.
31, 2003, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/
bdspcomm60903rpt.pdf (describing false entries amounting to $9 billion on
WorldCom's books made, with little or no apparent attempt to achieve
accuracy, and with the knowledge and at least passive acquiescence of
numerous employees who cooperated because they feared for their jobs);
Richard C. Breedan, Restoring Trust: Report to the Hon. Jed Rakoff,
U.S.D.Ct., S.D.N.Y., on CorporateGovernance for the Future of MCI, (Aug.
2003),
available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/
corpgov82603rpt.pdf (describing what appeared to be the largest
accounting fraud in history, characterizing it as a result of an absence of
"checks and balances" on an "imperial" CEO and proposing a "blueprint for
action").
26 See Bereford et al., supra note 25; Breedan, supra note 25.
Following the share-centered approach, Breedan describes $400 million
the company extended to Ebbers as "loans" from shareholders, although he
and his readers are surely aware of the difference between corporate and
shareholder assets. Id. at 2. He similarly describes other abuses of the
company as abuses of "shareholder interests." Id. In accordance with this
understanding of the problem, Breedan details a massive set of proposed
reforms, which he accurately summarizes as an "important shift in power
from the board to the shareholders." Id.
27 See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Ann Davis, HealthSouth Ex-CFO
Helps Suit, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2004, at C1 (describing CFO's statement
of his role in $2.7 billion accounting fraud); SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., 261
F. Supp. 2d, 1298, 1303 n.5 (N.D. Ala. 2003 ) (listing pending actions).
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accepting as "payment in kind" equally expensive
advertisements on their customers' websites.28
The
companies reported the sale as income even though nothing
of substance had happened, and, in the more egregious cases,
even found ways to conceal the associated expense.2 9
The drama of these headline scandals should not hide
from view the many other companies that overpaid their
executives during the boom or re-stated earnings (or should
have done so) after the bubble's collapse." While some of
these companies may have been within the letter of the law,
they nevertheless acted dishonestly. For example, scores of
publicly traded firms granted executives stock options
without reporting any associated expense.
Although
apparently legal, this accounting treatment is clearly
dishonest, since it allows the company to give away value
without reporting any expense. 1 Similarly, many publicly
28

See, e.g., Stewart Baker, The Other Bubble, WALL ST. J., July 17,

2003, at D8 (describing "capacity swaps" and similar gimmicks); In re
Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(describing Global Crossing's alleged use of "capacity swaps" to create the
misleading appearance of sales); Dennis K. Berman & Deborah Soloman,
Qwest May Settle SEC Swaps Case, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2003, at A3
(describing twenty public companies' use of "capacity swaps" to report
large revenue gains that the SEC views as improper); Dennis K. Berman
et al., What's Wrong, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at Al (describing
examples of widespread use of "bogus swaps" and "round trip trades of
advertising" near end of bubble).
' See, e.g., Berman et al., supra note 28 (describing how Global
Crossing booked "sales" as revenue, but listed the other side of the swap as
a "capital expense" which doesn't show up in operating revenue).
30 See, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh'sHeart: Harnessing
Altruistic Theory and BehavioralLaw and Economics to Rein in Executive
Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 811 (2003) (describing excessive CEO
compensation); Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B and Four Hundred
for C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File
Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115 (2002) (describing excessive CEO
compensation); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 108
(indicating that ten percent of publicly traded companies restated their
earnings between Jan. 1997 and June 2002).
" The practice facially violates the general requirement of GAAP that
the company's books fairly present its financial condition and the Rule
10(b)(5) requirement that the company's financial disclosures not be false
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traded companies routinely report higher profits to the
public than to the IRS. This practice of keeping double
books, once thought to be patently dishonest, necessarily
means that corporations are being less candid or honest in
one or the other set of their books and in particular in their
public disclosures. Any investor would surely consider a
company's equivocation to be material information and
would want to know whether the company is lying to the IRS
or taxpayers or to its shareholders.32
or misleading. However, in 1999 a specific attempt to change GAAP to
require disclosure of granted options as an expense was defeated after a
highly publicized and politically charged debate. See, e.g., Matthew A.
Melone, United States Accounting Standards-Rules or Principles? The
Devil Is Not in the Details, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161, 1216-21 (2004).
Arguably, this debate over the specific rule leads to the inference that,
common sense notwithstanding, it is not (legally) misleading to take the
position that the grant of stock options is not an expense to the companyeven though the recipient ends up with value and the company's other
shareholders lose an equal amount. As I write, it seems possible that the
2000 battle will be revisited and reversed.
32 See, e.g., Alan Murray, Inflated Profits in Corporate Books Is Half
the Story, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2002, at A4 (arguing that corporate tax
returns should be public and that a single measure of corporate income
should apply for both tax and securities disclosure purposes); David Cay
Johnston, Wall Street Firms Are Faulted in Report on Enron's Taxes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at C1 (reporting that Enron was able to
simultaneously increase its publicly reported income and cut its taxable
income by the use of complex tax shelters, and that "the use of tax shelters
has become so widespread among the 10,000 largest corporations that
their effective tax rate was just twenty percent in 1999, according to the
IRS").
Note that the Internal Revenue Code already provides that large
corporate shareholders may inspect corporate tax returns.
I.R.C.
§ 6103(e)(1)(D)(iii) (2003) (providing that corporate tax returns are open to
shareholders of record holding more than one percent of the corporation's
outstanding stock). It is not clear why this provision is insufficient to
make tax returns generally available to Wall Street analysts. One would
expect that if companies regularly take a different position to the IRS than
to the SEC, analysts would be interested in the former as well as the
latter, and that large shareholders could make a side business of selling
access to the returns. But perhaps analysts have not focused on the
usefulness of tax returns or perhaps there is another aspect of the
regulatory regime that I do not understand.
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Anecdotal evidence testifies to the extent of the scandals.
The companies involved have supplied enough "bad guys" to
fill up at least two competing sets of playing cards imitating
Indeed, by September 2002,
the military's Iraq deck.3
Business Week thought it newsworthy that they had found
six examples of "The Good CEO."34 Executive honesty was
entering the ranks of "man bites dog."
Enron exemplified an era. At its peak, it was celebrated
as a new and better way of doing business, making
shareholders and employees money by the bushel while
increasing the efficiency of our energy markets to everyone's
benefit. Enron seemed to demonstrate the power of the
market to overcome the inefficiencies of government
regulation and internal corporate bureaucracy alike. In
retrospect, its economic successes appear to have been
mostly smoke and mirrors, with just enough reality to allow
a handful of top managers to become seriously rich by
lightening the pockets of consumers, shareholders, and
employees alike. It is only slightly unfair, then, to name the
general phenomenon after its one of its most flagrant
practitioners.
Treating Enron as the symbolic center is also appropriate
because Enron's misbehavior was not restricted to corporate
law violations. If Enron's economic successes were mainly
illusions, its successes in evading the regulatory power of
government that was supposed to restrain its pursuit of
profit unfortunately were all too real. Not only did Jeffrey
Skilling leave "step[ping] in if a product is dangerous" to the
It should also be noted that under some circumstances, differences in
tax and GAAP accounting may require two sets of books. This of course
does not make the practice any less deceptive, although it may suggest
that the practitionersare not necessarily wrongdoers. There is no reason I
am aware of that companies keeping two sets of books could not supply
both sets side-by-side to their investors and the IRS.
' See, e.g., http://shareholdersmostwanted.com ("The original greedy
executive card deck"); http://www.thestackeddeck.com (playing cards
featuring "America's least wanted" executives from thirty-four entities
involved in scandals).
' Nanette Byrnes et al., The Good CEO, Bus. WK., Sept. 23, 2002, at
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government, his firm excelled at convincing (or misleading)
the government not to object to danger, either.
Thus, Enron was involved in classic regulatory corporate
scandals-most famously, manipulating the California
energy market in ways that appear to have cost Californians
huge sums and former California Governor Gray Davis his
job.35
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
blamed regulatory failure, but it clearly saw the problem to
be attributable as well to the other side: "what Committee
staff for the majority found was an agency that was no match
for a determined Enron."36 The report goes on to detail
extensive, deliberate violation of clear rules and norms by
Enron, including a possible $1 billion transfer from
ratepayers to Enron just before its bankruptcy, market
manipulation, illegal trades and so on. Other investigators
implicated Enron in other scandals, including major human
rights violations abroad. 7
" See Rebecca Smith, Schwarzenegger May Return to EnergyDeregulationModel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2002, at A5.
"6 Committee Staff Investigation of FERC's Oversight of Enron Corp.,
Nov. 12, 2002, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron
11l202fercmemo.pdf.
"Regulatory failure" of this type is entirely
predictable. Corporations that are bent on breaking the law have stronger
incentives and greater resources to do so than their regulators have to
catch them. The question is why we endow institutions with anti-social
incentives and resources, not why we cannot catch them later.
" See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 109 (reporting that
villagers' opposition to Enron's $3 billion gas-powered Dabhol electric
power plant in the Indian state of Maharashtra was "met with serious,
sometimes brutal human rights violations carried out on behalf of the
state's and the company's interests"). Although most of the violence
described in that report was by state actors, the report charges (1) that
Enron "benefited directly from an official policy of suppressing dissent
through misuse of the law, harassment of anti-Enron protest leaders and
prominent environmental activists, and police practices ranging from
arbitrary to brutal," id. at 106-07; (2) that Enron "pa[id] the state forces
that committed human rights violations [and] it provided other material
support to these forces" including use of its helicopters, etc., id. at 106; and
(3) that Enron "failed to act on credible allegations that its own contractors
were engaged in criminal activity" id., including "engag[ing] in a pattern of
harassment, intimidation, and attacks on individuals opposed to the
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Finally, Enron was famous for its political connections,
which it used, possibly legally but clearly in violation of basic
republican principles of a self-governing democracy, to win
favors for itself and its favored politicians and, of course, to
reduce the likelihood of the government "step[ping] in."" The
House Committee on Governance Reform minority staff
reports that, "Enron Corporation was President George W.
Bush's number-one career patron. Since 1993, Enron and its
employees gave the President $736,800 in political and
Even without White House
related contributions."3 9
that
report
was
able to document at least 40
cooperation,
direct contacts between Enron and White House officials in
2001, over $3 million spent on thirty-six outside registered
lobbyists at fourteen lobbying firms and seventy-three
contacts between the Army Secretary and Enron officials and
other alleged close connections between the company and the
upper reaches of the Bush Administration, including deep
Dabhol Power project," id. at 3, with Enron's knowledge, id. at 110-11.
The report also describes widespread allegations of corruption and
financial impropriety in connection with the project, the largest electric
power plant in the world, which was a centerpiece of a highly controversial
energy privatization plan and a key issue in several hotly contested
elections.
3' MINORITY STAFF, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 107th
CONG.,

BUSH

ADMINISTRATION

CONTACTS

WITH

ENRON

(May

2002),

available at http://www.democrats.house.reform.gov/documents/200408
I have argued elsewhere that corporate
17122823-67561.pdf.
interventions into our political debate, whether by (legal) lobbying,
(constitutionally protected) direct communications to the electorate, or
(illegal) contributions to candidates, should always be viewed as deeply
problematic in a self-governing republic. Corporations, like government in
classic liberal theory, can never be trusted fully to represent those for
whom they purport to speak-all the more so since corporations are
directed by both law and market to speak for the principle of profit
maximization, not for any citizen. See generally, Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Essential Speech: Why CorporateSpeech Is Not Free, 83 IOwA L. REV. 995
(1998), available at http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/pdf/Essential
Speech.pdf [hereinafter EssentialSpeech].
'9 MINORITY STAFF, HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM

107th CONG.,

BUSH

(May 2002), available at
http://www.democrats.house.reform.gov/documents/2004081712282367561.pdf.

ADMINISTRATION

CONTACTS

WITH

ENRON

ENRONITIS
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influence on the Vice-President's National Energy Policy
Development Group.4 °
But the President was far from Enron's only prot6g6 or
patron.
The last report the Enron Political Action
Committee filed with the Federal Elections Commission is
967 pages long.' The FEC, of course, regulates only direct
electoral intervention, not conventional lobbying, so this may
be only the tip of the iceberg.
Enron, as Skilling's student-era quote foreshadows, was
acting in the interests of profit, not the public. At least, one
might so conclude from a different staff report created for
Some of the
Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA).4'
regulatory failure may yet turn out to be the crude result of
pressure from Enron's friends in high places. More of the
failure seems to have been the result of a climate of
Enron,
and
other
that
businesses-can-do-no-wrong
companies like it, helped to create and finance. As the
Senate Committee staff reported, "Enron was very
aggressive about using ... the regulatory process to further
its own strategic business goals and protect its own economic
interests," and FERC and other regulators were unable to

'0 Id.

See also In

re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(describing allegation that Enron CEO Kenneth Lay participated in nonpublic meetings of the NEPDG as if he were a member); Walker v. Cheney,
230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying standing to comptroller general
in case involving similar allegations).
, Enron Corp. Political Action Comm., Inc., July 21, 2001 Report of
Receipts and Disbursements, available at http//news.findlaw.com/hdcos/
docs/enronlepacrpt072701.pdf.
42 MINORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM 107th
CONG.,
REPORT ON HOW THE WHITE HOUSE ENERGY PLAN BENEFITED ENRON (Jan.

16, 2002), available at http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/documents/
20040830154930-11712.pdf; see also MINORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
GOV'T REFORM 107th CONG., FACT SHEET: WHITE HOUSE ENERGY PLAN
REFLECTS SEVEN OF EIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS IN ENRON MEMO (Jan 31,

2002), available at http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/documents/
20040830150832-54097.pdf (both detailing extensive and effective political
lobbying by Enron).
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redirect Enron's influence in socially useful directions.43
Representative Waxman's staff prepared a thirteen-page
listing of regulatory events that contributed to Enron's
failure, nearly all of which are instances in which Enron
successfully lobbied for a particular rule or result that later
turned out not to be in the public interest (in the staffs
assessment)." Although that report blames "lax regulation"
for the problems, surely primary responsibility lies with the
malefactor Enron rather than the government.
So we can add to the definition of Enronitis:
2. A malfunction of corporate governance in which
corporations in the pursuit of profit, manipulate
markets, deceive consumers, create unsafe or
polluting conditions, lobby to change the regulations
meant to keep them operating in socially productive
ways, commit human rights violations abroad or
otherwise act in anti-social, dangerous, or socially
inefficient manners.
Particularly referring to
instances in which corporate actors justify the firm's
anti-social behavior or anti-republican political
interventions by appealing to the norm of profit
maximization.
Corporate law, in its share-centered version, teaches that
the sole responsibility of the corporate manager is to increase
returns to shares. It is "the government's job to step in if a
product is dangerous," ' but the firm, acting in the imagined
interests of its fictional shareholders, views itself as justified
in taking any possible action to deflect, distract or avoid the
government. We have set the strong forces of the market at
war with the weak ones of regulation.
Skilling's statement clearly epitomizes the share-centered
view. Managers have one responsibility and one alone. On
COMMITTEE STAFF INVESTIGATION OF

CORP,

FERC's

OVERSIGHT OF ENRON

supra note 36, at 7, 8.

44 MINORITY STAFF,

HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM 107th CONG., FACT

SHEET: How LAx REGULATION AND INADEQUATE OVERSIGHT CONTRIBUTED TO

(Feb. 7, 2002, revised June 4, 2002), available at
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/documents/2004083015081539986.pdf.
4" FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 2, at 28.
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this view, managers serve the market, and government
makes the market serve the people.
But markets are
powerful and regulators generally are weak. If we tell our
corporate managers that they should pursue profit by any
means they can, they are likely to do it and get away with it.
B.

Reform, Regulation and Repression

In the wake of the 2000 stock market collapse, numerous
corporate reform proposals have been made.
While it
appears that little will change in state corporate law on the
books, practice is already different. Corporations are adding
"independent" directors; the British norm of separating the
CEO from the Chairman of the Board is receiving additional
attention; 46 and companies are scrambling to adopt new and
presumably more accurate accounting standards. At the
Federal level, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act dramatically changes
disclosure responsibilities and imposes new obligations on
managers.47
The stock exchanges have enacted some
mandatory changes and urged others.48 The accounting
See, e.g.,
CEO/CHAIRMAN

CORPORATE LIBRARY,

EXCLUSIVE

SPECIAL REPORT

ON

S&P
500,
available at
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/Governance-ResearchIspotlighttopics/spotlight/boardsanddirectors/SplitChairs2004.html
(Mar.
2004)
(chart detailing the relationships of current officials to the companies they
head).
41 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745
(2002) (imposing many new requirements, including CEO certification as
to the accuracy of disclosures. See, e.g., §§ 302, 906, 404).
48 See, e.g., Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (approved
Nov.
4, 2003) (to be codified at NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A),
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (requiring
that shareholders be given the opportunity to vote on all equitycompensation plans; requiring listed companies to have a majority of
independent directors; tightening the definition of independent director to
exclude recently retired employees, certain professionals and certain
interlocking board memberships; requiring non-management directors to
meet
without
managers
present;
requiring
independent
nominating/corporate governance, compensation, and audit committees;
setting minimum audit committee standards; requiring internal audit
functions; requiring and setting standards for corporate governance
SPLITS

IN

THE
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profession's self-regulatory body, the FASB, with solid
political backing decisively rejected expensing stock option
grants in 1994 on the multiple (and contradictory) grounds
that (1) they are too difficult to value, (2) they are already
fully disclosed, (3) they are not really expenses, and
(4) expensing them would hurt reported profits.
Subsequently it has discovered that the undoubted
difficulties of valuation are not a reason to ignore stock
option grants after all.49 Many other proposals to increase
the power, responsibility or independence of "gatekeepers"
such as accountants, stock analysts, lawyers and the SEC
are on the table." It is even possible that reforms of the tax
code or IRS procedures will prevent future instances of the
IRS discovering and failing to act on misleading SEC
disclosures, or will align tax and securities income
accounting.5

guidelines; requiring a code of business ethics; requiring certain
disclosures and CEO certification of compliance; and authorizing NYSE
sanctions for violation).
49 See
Financial Accounting Series: Share Based Payment,
Amendment of FASB Statements No. 123 and 95 (proposed Mar. 31, 2004)
(comment deadline June 30, 2004), available at http://www.fasb.org/
See also Cassell Bryan-Low, S&P
draftledshare-basedpayment.pdf.
Sheds Light On Accounting For Pension Costs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2002,
at C1. Expensing stock option grants would have reduced the reported
earnings of the S&P 500 by almost twenty percent in 2001-2002. Id.
' See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 63 (advocating
strengthening independence of gatekeepers); Coffee, supra note 8
(discussing gatekeeper failures); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for
Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1185
(2003) (discussing failures of lawyers as gatekeepers and proposing
reforms to increase independent counselor role).
"' See Johnston, supra note 32 (reporting that Enron took advantage
of the differences between tax and accounting rules to report tax losses
and accounting profits, and that when "an unnamed IRS appeals officer
concluded that Enron's reports to shareholders 'fooled' both investors and
securities regulators about its financial condition ... [tihe IRS settled the
audit issues in tax court, without any disclosure of the suspicions about
Enron's financial statements").
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These reforms are important, widely debated and even
This Article, however,
possibly still under-analyzed.5 2
approaches the reforms from a more abstract or theoretical
perspective.
To date, the Enronitis problem has been diagnosed as a
disease of managers who are insufficiently attentive to the
interests of shareholders.53 The medicine has flowed from the
diagnosis: the proposed remedies are intended to tie
managers more closely to the needs of the stock market." If
the Enron problem is the result of too weak a legal mandate
supporting the share-centered paradigm of corporate law, the
law should step in to support that paradigm. There is much
truth to this diagnosis, and the reforms may mitigate the
symptoms, particularly in the short run. The reforms may
well make directors more independent so that they can
ensure that managers work for the market, shares may be
allowed to vote on managerial equity compensation so that
compensation plans will be more closely tied to the will of the
52

Although a recent Westlaw search on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act alone

turned up 1990 hits in Westlaw's law journal database, first principles
suggest that something must remain to be said.
See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate
Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317
(2004) ("The scandals arose in large part out of a failure of managerial
oversight. Officers and directors did not adequately protect the interests of
the corporation.").
" See, e.g., Breedan, supra note 25, at 45-147 (making seventy-eight
specific suggestions for corporate governance reform designed to empower
shares of the former WorldCom, including embedding some in Articles that
can only be changed with share consent; increasing shareholder access to
the proxy contest system beyond SEC standards; increasing the frequency
of director elections and allowing shareholders to nominate candidates
directly with access to the company's proxy solicitation statement;
increasing the independence of board members, board training and board
of management; changing board
ability to act independently
compensation; creating a non-executive board chair; adding board term
limits; limiting executive compensation over $15 million or by stock option
grants without share approval; increasing financial transparency and, by
increasing dividend payouts and limiting anti-takeover provisions,
increasing company dependence on the financial markets; and
strengthening internal legal compliance controls).
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market and accounting may become more transparent and
disclosure more accurate to help the financial markets
control managers.
Paradoxically, however, and less widely recognized,
Enronitis is also the predictable result of too strong a sharecentered view of the corporation. The profit maximization
ethos of the conventional share-centered corporation
demands that managers teach themselves to exploit
everyone around them. It is inevitable that some will learn
this lesson so well that they will exploit even those for whose
benefit they are supposed to be exploiting. The more we
reform to ensure that managers serve only the profitmaximization ethos, the more we can expect to see managers
who will hunt for new ways to evade the reforms. The sharecentered view of the corporation makes the corporation into a
machine, efficiently promoting one value at the expense of all
others, even when the humans involved would long ago have
decided that the interests of the nation, individuals, the
environment, legality or simple human decency should
prevail.5 The power of strong market incentives assures
that, all too often, the pressures we are creating to act badly
will overcome the will (and enforcement powers) to act in
society's interests. 6
" I have discussed the corporation's inability to act like a citizen at
greater length elsewhere. See generally Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Delaware
and
Democracy:
The
Puzzle
of
Corporate
Law,
at
http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/pdf/PuzzleofCorporateLaw.pdf
(May
14, 2003); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Lawrence Mitchell's Corporate
Responsibility, 12 LAw. & POL. BOOK REV. 201-04 (2002), available at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvptlpbr/subpages/reviews/mitchellci.html (book
review); Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 38; Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996), available at
http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/pdf/FictionalShareholders.pdf
[hereinafter Fictional Shareholders]. For a powerful and accessible
representation of the problem, see THE CORPORATION (Big Picture Media
Corp. 2003), website at http://www.thecorporation.com (a documentary
film that argues that corporations should be understood as psychopaths).
6 The power of market incentives to press actors towards socially
destructive action is widely noted. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Limited
Options, LEGAL AFF. 52 (Dec. 2003) (comparing perverse incentives that
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III. THE SHARE-CENTERED PARADIGM:
MUTUALLY ASSURED EXPLOITATION
A. Shares, Not Shareholders
According to the share-centered view of the corporation,
the corporation has only one legitimate goal: maximization of
share value.57 Standard terminology states that corporate
directors and managers have a fiduciary obligation to act in
the interests of the shareholders. In fact, however, the only
interests that are considered are those of the role of a
theoretical shareholder, not of the people who own shares.
It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that human
shareholders are necessarily better off if their shares
increase in price, regardless of the impact of the company's
share-value maximizing behavior on other aspects of their
lives. The phrase "maximization of shareholder value"
misleadingly suggests that share prices are the only values
created the Savings and Loans scandal to perverse incentives behind
Enron); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 57 (describing perverse
incentives to distort financial statements or overemphasize short-term
results, including stock market reliance on quarterly results and executive
compensation schemes). The terminology of "perverse," however, suggests
that such incentives are anomalous and unusual. The best modem
evolutionary theory suggests that "perverse" incentives are pervasive. See,
e.g., JOsHuA M. EPSTEIN & ROBERT AXTELL, GROWING ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES SOCIAL SCIENCE FROM THE BoTToM UP 136-37 (1996) (describing the
Sugarscape studies as showing that market-like structures result in
attractive results under special circumstances and unattractive ones under
many other plausible ones).
"' The most famous judicial statement of the share-centered view is
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683 (Mich. 1919) (opining that a
business corporation may not be operated as a "semi-eleemosynary
institution" serving the perceived public good of managers and majority
shareholders even if it also generates extraordinary profits for
shareholders). See also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that, once the corporation is up for
sale, directors must act to maximize short-term share value regardless of
other considerations, even in circumstances where shareholders clearly
also have a large financial interest in bond values).
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that human shareholders hold. But people have many
interests, often conflicting, and few people will consider their
interest in maximizing share value to be the most important
of all their goals at all times.
The share-centered view of the corporation excludes all
those other shareholder views. Corporations are directed to
pursue their shareholders' interests only insofar as they are
the interests of shareholders, not bond investors, employees,
customers, consumers, neighbors, family members, citizens,
carriers of particular cultures, or inhabitants of a limited
earth with limited pollution absorption ability. Financial
and non-financial interests shareholders might have outside
their role in the firm are simply ignored.
Indeed, the share-centered view directs managers to limit
their consideration still further. Shareholders investing
according to modern portfolio theory are likely to be highly
diversified and, as a result, their interests even as
shareholders (of many companies) may diverge from the
single goal of the share-centered corporation. If a firm
increases its market share and profits at the expense of a
competitor (with some benefits to consumers), a pure
shareholder who owns shares of both firms will be worse off
to the extent that consumers are better off. Only rarely do
proponents of the share-centered view of the corporation
suggest that corporate managers take into account this type
of shareholder interest, perhaps because this shareholder
interest in anti-competitive collusion is so obviously opposed
to any social interest that might justify allowing publicly
held corporations to limit themselves to considering share
interests alone. 58
The share-centered view, in short, models shareholders as
if they were aliens, with no connection to the corporation, its
participants, or their fellow citizens except as undiversified
' For further discussion of the implications of taking a share-centered
view seriously while acknowledging the actual reality of institutional
shareholders, see Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern
Process of FinancialInnovation, and the Puzzle of ShareholderWelfare, 69
TEx. L. REV. 1273 (1991); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time and Fiduciary
Principlesin CorporateInvestment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277 (1990).
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stockholders.
The shareholders of the share-centered
corporation are not people but legal fictions, roles rather
than realities. To emphasize the narrow view of shareholder
interests taken by firms seeking to maximize share value, I
will speak of share-centeredness, share value and share
democracy rather than the more euphonious but seriously
misleading term, "shareholder" interests. 59

B. From Share-Centeredness to Enronitis
In the conventional view, the legitimate function of
corporate directors and managers is to work for the shares.0
All other goals and participants in the firm should be
considered as mere tools towards this end. In particular,
professional managers acting as the share value norm directs
them to should consider all firm participants (other than the
shares) as outsiders, with respect to whom one should decide
to cooperate, defect or exploit according to a rational analysis
of which practice will maximize share value.
"' The difference between shares and shareholders is the central
theme of Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note 55; it is also the

key reason why I argue in Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 38,
that corporations, as representatives of a legal fiction, are not appropriate
holders of the rights of citizens; and a key reason why I argue that market
processes are only imperfect and partial correctives to democratic failures.
See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty:
Judicial Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERs L. REV. 781

(2001), available at http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/pdf/Rutgers.pdf
[hereinafter Beyond the Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty].

' How to do this is of course difficult and often controversial. In
particular, long term and short term views will often conflict. With the
exception of firms in the limited "Revlon Mode" (when the company's sale
or dissolution is inevitable, see Revlon, 506 A.2d 173), courts generally
allow directors to choose freely between long and short-term share
interests without fear of judicial second-guessing. See, e.g., Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) ("a board may
reasonably consider the basic shareholder interests at stake including...
short term speculators [and] the long term investors"); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) ("The
fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a
time frame for achievement of corporate goals.").
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Even when the decision is to cooperate, however, the
relationship is basically exploitative. The only reason a
manager acting in good faith as a professional dedicated to
share value maximization would give anything to any
corporate participant (other than the shares) is because he or
she believes that doing so will result in more profits for the
firm's shares.6
The share-centered view of the corporation, thus, directs
managers to take an amoral, instrumental view of the
relationships in which they are enmeshed. Under this view,
all relationships are for an ulterior purpose, and when they
cease to serve that purpose they should be abandoned.
Indeed, the share-centered profit maximization view
suggests that a manager who treats corporate participants in
any other way is acting wrongfully, violating role morality
and perhaps even the law (although the business judgment
rule may make enforcement rather difficult).62 For example,
it is improper-a violation of role morality-to view
employees or suppliers as members of a team to whom long
term commitments have been made. Managers are expected
to treat all of the firm's relationships as arm's-length
bargaining between competitors.
The short trek from the conventional share-centered view
of the managerial role to Enronitis is over-determined.
Several independent aspects link the two. The central theme
that ties together the routes to Enronitis is the paradox of
the managerial role in a share-centered corporation.
Corporate law demands that managers simultaneously be
selfless servants and selfish masters. On the one hand, it
directs managers to be faithful agents, setting aside their
own interests entirely in order to act only on behalf of their
principals, the shares. But on the other hand, in the service
61

For further discussion of the role obligations of professionals, see

Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty, supra note 59.
62 The business judgment rule "posits a powerful presumption . . .of

protect[ion of] corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make,
and our courts will not second-guess these business judgments." Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). Thus many actions
that may be in breach of the director's duties will not be actionable.
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of this extreme altruism, they must ruthlessly exploit
everyone around them, projecting onto the shares an extreme
selfishness that takes no account of any interests but the
shares themselves, narrowly understood. Having maximally
exploited their fellow human corporate participants,
managers are then expected to selflessly hand over their
gains, ill and justly gotten, to the faceless legal abstraction of
Altruism and rationally selfthe fictional shareholder.
interested exploitation are extreme and radically opposed
positions, psychologically and politically. The managerial
role is deeply unstable and unlikely to hold.
C.

Selfish Shares

In acting altruistically towards the interests of their
principals (the shares), the manager-agents are directed to
ignore the actual human beings who own (often indirectly)
the shares. 3 In reality, many publicly held shares are held
by pension funds representing the very employees (and their
predecessors) whom managers are directed to treat as arm'slength opponents in a competitive negotiating game. More
generally, shareholders are the citizenry, or at least the
richer half of it. Roughly half of the shares of publicly traded
corporations are held by institutions6 that, in turn, represent
roughly the top half of the American income distribution.65
For most of these indirect shareholders, shareholdings are
only a small portion of their wealth (most of which is their
future earning capacity).66 Thus, actions that are in their
See supra, Part II.B.
See, e.g., MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM (1996); JAMES P.
HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM (2000)
(fiduciary institutions own about half of the publicly traded stock of U.S.
corporations).
65 See, e.g., EDWARD WOLFF, TOP HEAVY 27 (2000); LAWRENCE MISHEL
ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2000/2001 (2001).
r Most shareholders hold very small amounts of stock directly or
indirectly. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 65 (stating that in 1998, 48% of
households owned stocks directly or indirectly, but the poorest 99% of
households owned only about as much as the wealthiest 1%); MISHEL,
supra note 65, at 260 tbl. 4.3 (indicating that median net worth, including
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all assets and liabilities, for Americans was about $60,700 in 1998); id. at
tbl. 4.4 (indicating that median financial wealth was less than $37,000);
id. at tbl. 4.7 (while nearly half of Americans held equities in 1998, directly
or indirectly, only 36.3% of households held more than $5000 worth).
The very rich own most stock, and for those few individuals, equities
are a major part of their wealth. See WOLFF, supra note 65 (stating that in
1998, almost half of all stock by value was held by the richest 1%, those
with net worth over $3.35 million. This number, however, does not include
pension wealth, which is somewhat less skewed); Edward Wolff, Recent
Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1998, Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard
Coll. Working Paper No. 300, tbl. 6 available at http://www.levy.org, (in
1998, the richest 1% held 49.4% of stocks and mutual funds, or 42.1% if
retirement ftmds are included); MISHEL, supra note 65, at tbl. 4.9
(indicating that in 1998 households in the top 1.6% of incomes held
roughly half of all publicly traded stock. Including indirectly held stock
and pension plans, households in the top 8.5% held two-thirds of equities).
By lumping together the entire wealthiest 1% these numbers
understate the true extent of inequality in stock holdings. Piketty &
Saez's work on income indicates that, even within the upper classes,
income is extremely skewed: about 42% of income is received by the top
10% of the household income distribution (fig. 1), but of the income
received by that upper decile, about one-third goes to the top 1% (fig. 3 and
fig. 15), about 40% of that is received by the top .1% (fig. 16) and about half
of that is received by the top .01% (calculated from tbl. 1, fig. 4). Thomas
Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the US, 1913-1998, Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Series No. 8467, available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8467.
Even this may understate the true
inequality of the income distribution, since Piketty & Saez's work is
derived from income tax returns and the rich are more likely to have the
sorts of income that are harder to define and capture in an income tax
regime. Wealth is distributed far more unequally than income, and
financial wealth is more concentrated than wealth generally. See e.g.,
Edward Wolff et al., Household Wealth, Public Consumption and Economic
Well-Being in the United States, Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. at Bard Coll.
Working Paper No. 386, available at http://www.levy.org (demonstrating
that measured inequality increases when imputed income from wealth is
added to standard income measures); Arthur B. Kennickell, A Rolling
Tide: Changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the U.S., 1989-2001, Fed.
Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series 2003, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200324/200324abs.html
(indicating that in 2001 the richest 400 households controlled
approximately 2% of U.S. financial and non-financial wealth, and that the
richest 1%--those with a net worth exceeding $5.8 million-controlled
about one-third); MISHEL, supra note 65, at tbl. 4.1 (top 1% receive 16.6%
of all income but hold 47.3% of financial assets). Thus, it is safe to assume
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interests as a shareholder are likely often to be in conflict
with other, more important, interests. If a firm increases
share value by $1 per share by compromising its
environmental standards or reducing employee benefits, a
shareholder holding 100 shares would lose value if she cares
more than $100 worth about the environmental damage or
the benefits. Thus, maximization of share value may or may
not maximize value to the human shareholders, depending
on the relative importance of the individual shareholder's
share value as opposed to his or her other relationships with
the firm.
Even if maximization of share value were in a particular
human shareholder's financial interests, real human beings
have interests beyond their finances. Few real people are as
disconnected from social relationships as the fiction that
drives the share value maximization model. It is virtually
inconceivable that the entire half of America that holds
shares would agree on how to balance their desire for profits
in the stock market, on the one hand, with their desires for
the many political goods that may conflict with profit, on the
other.
Although it may not be immediately obvious in market
centered politics, eventually nearly every human value will
conflict with profit, and nearly everyone will find some value
that is more important than profit at some point. Thus:

that the fractal character of inequality is even more extreme with respect
to wealth, so that if half our financial wealth is held by the top 1%, the
bulk of that is held by the top .1%, and so on. The great concentration of
wealth in a small part of the population again suggests that most
shareholders would find their shares to be a relatively small part of even
their financial interests.
Moreover, even among the very rich, most income is from wages
(suggesting, but not by any means demonstrating, that even for many of
the extremely rich most wealth is in the form ofjob prospects). See Piketty
& Saez, supra, at fig. 6 (indicating that in 1998, approximately 60% of the
income of households in the top .1% of taxpayers was from salary. Note,
however, that Piketty & Saez's figures may overstate the influence of
salary income since they do not include capital gains in income and they
appear to include stock grants as salary.
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the
protecting
(whether
regulations
Safety
environment, consumers, employees or innocent
bystanders) generally increase private costs to the
hazard-creator, thereby reducing its profits, even as
those regulations are reducing social costs. Fictional
shareholders will always choose profits when they
conflict with safety. No real person is that one-sided.
Advertising increases demand for products, and
But most human
therefore, usually, profits.
shareholders will be able to identify some product
made by a publicly traded company that they wish the
world had less of-violent movies, cigarettes, junk
food, global warming gases, the music their kids listen
to, direct mail, internet pornography and even shoddy
Fictional shareholders will always
plastic toys.
attempt to increase demand even for unattractive
products. This is not true for real citizens-even
citizens inclined to leave the matter to the market.
Particular companies may find foreign trade (or limits
on it) profit enhancing. Their individual shareholders
may find that position conflicts with other values they
hold, even values as simple as whether the trading
partners who are enriched (or impoverished) are
countries or elites that should be our allies or
enemies.
Maximum profit often will require that a company
pick up and abandon a particular locale (especially
labor
perverse
American
the
since,
under
unionization rules, relocation is usually the easiest
way to escape unionization and because American
localism encourages localities to invite companies to
jump ship as they compete in lowering effective
shareholders
Fictional
taxation).
enterprise
interested only in the value of their shares will
always applaud such moves in the name of profit. But
human investors live in particular places, as do
employees and other human beings associated with
the corporation. Often, the human beings behind the
fiction will share the needs of those particular people
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in the forsaken places or will empathize with them.
Real human investors often prefer more stability than
profit maximization demands.
* Perhaps what is most significant for American politics
as a whole is that maximum profit requires employees
who are maximally flexible: the famous American
flexible labor market. But that means that we must
be willing to be at work rather than raising children
or caring for parents; that we must be willing to move
locations rather than build deeply rooted communities
or multi-generational families; that we must be
willing to put one or two careers ahead of marital
depth. Largely, we Americans are willing to do those
things (at least by comparison, for example, with the
French).
Even so, there is some limit to our
flexibility. The share value maximization directive
does not have such a limit.
Managers are required to ignore these human
complexities, instead imagining their shareholders to be
essentialized, fictionalized, one-dimensional investors with
no commitments, values or relationships beyond the desire
that their shares increase in value.67 Thus, managers are
directed to de-humanize even the one group they are not
explicitly directed to treat as exploitable resources. Thinking
of shareholders as if they were no more than shares-thin
fictions interested in nothing but increasing the value of a
particular stockholding at any cost despite other moral,
political or even financial values-managers step out of
relationship even with their alleged beneficiaries.
67

Indeed, managers are urged even to ignore the complexities of

shareholders' investment role. A diversified shareholder is likely to have a
different financial interest, even in the narrowest sense, than the
undiversified fiction. A publicly traded company successfully seizing
market share from another publicly traded company does nothing
whatsoever for the finances of an index investor; what the stock of the one
company gains, the stock of the other will lose. See Greenwood, Fictional
Shareholders,supra note 55; Hu, New FinancialProducts, supra note 58;
Hu, Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, supra
note 58.
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Surely everyone can find something that is profitable but
nonetheless aesthetically, morally or politically unattractive.
Maximum profit for given companies inevitably will require
decisions that will conflict with particular values of
individual investors. Shares as constructed by corporate
law, in contrast, value nothing but increasing the present
discounted value of their long-term cash flows (future
dividends and final period payment).68
These shares
represent the selfish gene, the single-minded money
maximizer of introductory economic theory, anti-social
monomania, all taken to the logical extreme. 9 To shares and
their fictional shareholders, the people, cultures, and ideas
Americans value are just resources to be maximally
exploited, never values in themselves. If these shares were
people, Americans would ostracize them, lock them up, or
even fight a Revolutionary War of Independence against
them.
In the end, the fictional shareholder resembles nothing
more than a classic imperialist oppressor. The fiction we
have created treats us as if we were a colonized people-to be
befriended, used, or discarded only according to the interests
of the colonizing power. In this case, the colonizer is us and
we are the colonized. Our needs and interests should count
for more to us than mere means to the profit-maximization
end. Managers serving in this imaginary role are serving no
human being.

' For an accessible summary of modern corporate finance theory, see
& COFFEE, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE (West Group
Publishing 1996).
69 Compare
THE CORPORATION,
supra note 55 (arguing that
corporations
act like psychopaths), with Greenwood, Fictional
Shareholders,supra note 55.
KLEIN
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IV. APPLICATIONS: PERVERSE RESULTS
A. Market v. Agency: Strangers in the Bazaar or
Fellow Citizens of the Republic
To better understand how decent Americans working in
fine institutions can end up treating their fellow citizens as
colonized aliens to be maximally exploited, or as mere means
to the end of profit, let us step back to examine some
unexpected aspects of the well-known legal norms by which
we live. American law, and, more generally, American
culture, present at least two radically different norms for
treating others. Corporate law attempts to mediate the
irreconcilable conflicts between them.
1. Market
The market norm is deeply impersonal, individualistic
and competitive. In the market, each person can expect to be
able to buy or sell on the same terms as everyone else,
without regard for personal relationships or individual
characteristics. My money is as green is yours, and therefore
all sumptuary laws, caste privileges, or guild restrictions are
presumptively improper in a capitalist market. All that
counts is the product that is offered for sale and the money
that is offered to purchase it.
At the limit, a fully competitive market, such as our stock
market, should be anonymous.
Since personal
characteristics, including even personal identity, are
irrelevant and should not affect the bargains struck, there is
no legitimate reason to know with whom you are doing
business.
Of course, sometimes the product being sold is
inseparable from the person selling it. For example, there is
no way for me to sell my labor skills or expertise or teambuilding abilities anonymously. Yet even where anonymity
is impossible, market norms seek to exclude personal
relationships and personal characteristics to the extent
possible, creating a notion of "merit" that is independent of
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the personal characteristics of the market participant. For
this reason, nepotism is illegal in the public sector and
questionable if not disreputable in the private one.
Discrimination that allows irrelevant personal or status
characteristics to influence a market transaction is
presumptively improper. The market should be not only
color-blind but also blind to all irrelevant characteristics. In
the market, only skills and cash count. The person carrying
them should not."0
In short, the market is the world of Sir Henry Maine's
contract, in which status and relationship have no place.7
Similarly, it is the world of Burke's "sophisters, economists,
and calculators" with no room for sentiment, tradition or
"sensibility of principle, that chastity of honor which felt a
stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it
mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and
under which vice itself lost half its evil by losing all its
grossness."7 2
Market norms are not only impersonal but also selfinterested.
In this sphere, it is acceptable and even
commendable for persons with superior information to act on
it to the detriment of their trading counterparts. If, for
example, I recognize that a painting in the flea market is a
Rembrandt, I am entitled to the coup of buying it for the
price of a remnant. In the world of the market, people are
imagined to be isolated monads, strangers interested only in
getting ahead, with no interest in others except as
instruments to their own good.73

70

I have elaborated this point elsewhere.

See, e.g., Greenwood,

Fictional Shareholders, supra note 55. This concept is far from original;
rather, it is the core of the liberal market attack on medieval caste status
and its Jim Crow successors.
'1 SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION

TO MODERN IDEAS

(E.P.

Dutton 1954) (1878) (elaborating the status vs. contract distinction).
72

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 86

(Th. Mahoney, ed. 1955) (1790).
"3 This section summarizes views I expounded at length in Greenwood,
Beyond the Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty, supra note 59.
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2. Agency
In contrast, the agency norm is relationship- (and status-)
based, altruistic and cooperative. Even abstractly, an agent
cannot be imagined to be an isolated individual making
contact with other people only to trade anonymously. Nor
can the law of agency be imagined to be limited only to
policing theft and deceit.
Rather, an agent exists only in relationship to the
principal, as someone who has agreed to act for, and under
the direction of, her principal. As the Restatement defines it,
"[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act.""
Moreover, in contrast to the arm's-length market relation,
agency is a fiduciary relationship.75 Agents are expected to
set aside their own interests and work "solely for the benefit
of the principal in all matters connected with [their]
agency."76 While a market participant is expected to bargain
hard and to profit maximize at the expense of his counterparty, by contrast, an agent "who makes a profit in
connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of
the principal is under a duty to give such profit to the
principal.""
If the market often seems to rely on an image of Robinson
Crusoe-like individuals selling their products in an
anonymous market, agency relies on more homely,
communal pictures.78 Here the metaphor becomes one of
friends sharing, parents and children sacrificing for one

"' Restatement (Second) Agency, § 1(1) (1958).
Id. § 13.

71
76

Id. § 387.

1

Id. § 388.

7'

DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE

1999) (1719).

(Oxford University Press, Inc.
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another, patriots working for the common good, or the Three
Musketeers declaring "one for all and all for one." "
Far from anonymous, this sphere is intensely particular
and intensely conscious of the differences between otherwise
similar people. Relationships are all that count. The agent
must treat different people differently. It would be grossly
inappropriate for a mother to treat her child in the same
manner she would treat an outsider; so too for a friend who
treated a friend like a stranger, or a citizen who refused to
distinguish between compatriots
and aliens.
In
relationships, nepotism is not scandalous but required.
Similarly, an agent must always distinguish between the
principal for whom she is a fiduciary and selflessly works,
and strangers, with whom she, or her principal, remains at
market arm's-length. The market is a world of strangers
ruled by disinterested justice blind to persons. Agency, in
contrast, is a relationship closer to friendship in which
persons are all-important.
Self-interested rational
maximizers have no place here.
3. Corporate Law's Mediation
Corporate law constructs the corporation as an oasis of
agency in the market. In the market, employees are arm'slength contractors each pursuing their own self-interested
good.
Within the employment market, as contracting
opposites, they and their employers are competitors, entitled
(within the rules of a fair battle) to fight for themselves as
hard as they are capable. But in the firm, they are agents,
required to set aside their own interests to work for their
principal, the firm itself. As Cardozo put it in Meinhard v.
Salmon, copartners:
owe to one another... the duty of the finest loyalty.
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden
to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market
ALEXANDRE DUMAS, THE THREE MUSKETEERS (Jacques Le Clercq
trans., Modern Library ed., Random House, Inc. 1999) (1844).
79
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place. Not honesty alone but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive. . . . Loyalty and
comradeship are not so easily abjured."
The agency rules and the market rules obviously conflict,
and much of the interest of corporate law concerns the
problems that result from the dual role of employees as
simultaneously self-interested market capitalists and
altruistic, selfless agents. We sign on as employees in the
world of the self-interested, impersonal, arm's-length
market, but once employed, switch to the altruistic fiduciary
world of agency.
But the share value maximization principle disrupts the
delicate balance (or churning conflict) of corporate law. It
commands managers, in their role as selfless agents, to treat
all their fellow agents according to the workaday norms of
self-interested arm's-length conduct in a competitive market
place while simultaneously demanding that both employees
and managers act selflessly. As explicated below, this is an
impossible task.
4. Creating Cooperation: The Pre-conditions to
Agency
In the long run, people learn to cooperate only with those
who cooperate back. Only fools or romantic lovers will
continue to selflessly sacrifice for someone once they realize
that the object of their sacrifice will uninhibitedly take
advantage of their selflessness as if they were arm's-length
competitors.8' Few people, however, fall in love with their
"0249 N.Y. 458, 463-66 (1928). Although Cardozo in Meinhard is
explicating the duties that "co-adventurers" (even the language is
reminiscent of Dumas!) owe to each other, the case is an accurate, if
flamboyant, description of the general duty that an agent owes to his or
her principal, which is the duty that an employee owes the employer.
8" The possibility, but fragility, of cooperation is a central theme of
both game theory and evolutionary biology. See, e.g., ELLIOTT SOBER &
DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF

(arguing that "social norms function
largely, though not entirely, to make human groups function as adaptive
UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR 173 (2003)
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employers. Therefore, to be successful, a firm must convince
its employees to work for it (rather than for themselves) by
convincing them that their sacrifices will generate responses
in kind. Were they to figure out that the firm sees them
purely instrumentally, employees treated by the firm at
arm's-length would treat it in the same way, whatever the
law may say about the obligations of agents.
Thus,
managers who openly treat firm members like arm's-length
competitors destroy the plausibility of the agency role and
violate their own duty to act in the best interest of the
corporation.
Managers therefore live a lie. They must attempt to
convince employees that the firm will respond to employee
sacrifice with cooperation of its own, as if it saw them as
partners in a common enterprise bound by mutual
responsibilities of agency. While doing this, managers must
always remember that their own fiduciary duty to the firm
requires them to be prepared to sacrifice employee interests
whenever a rational calculation indicates that defection will
gain the firm more than cooperation.
The image of
mutuality they must project to employees always remains an
illusion, because the share value maximization principle
requires that employees, like all firm participants other than
shares, be treated as mere means to the end of profitmaximization, as tools to be exploited rather than partners
in a cooperative enterprise.
Managers constructing the firm as a tool to the end of
share value maximization treat the people with whom they
units" in the biological sense). Corporate law and economic theories of the
firm, of course, have long assumed in a fairly unreflective manner that the
black box of the firm is the relevant unit for selection in the market. Only
those firms that successfully create an internal culture conducive to
survival in the market will survive. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The
"Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 407, 418 (1989) (summarizing the mainstream view as "contract
forms with the lowest costs survive"). The argument of this article can be
understood, in part, as a claim that although an internal culture of
cooperation is usually advantageous for the firm's survival in a market
characterized by intense competition, corporate law drives the human
actors in the firm away from the psychological underpinnings of altruism.
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work as means, not ends. Because they see themselves as
competitors with the people with whom they are working,
they learn as part of their ordinary life to break ordinary
social solidarity.
Learning to exploit ruthlessly is
surprisingly difficult. This we learned in the first wave of
the 1980s leveraged buyout boom, when a generation of
managers fought bitterly in opposition to the new
dispensation of abandoning ordinary social norms in order to
get extraordinarily rich.82 But cynicism can be learned, and
managers subjected to the powerful incentives of the share
value maximization principle do eventually learn it.
Successful managers learn to project solidarity while
watching, always, for the chance to defect.
This training, however, surely creates cynics, not faithful
agents. As a rule, one does not learn to be a saint by daily
sinning.83 A manager whose lived experience is a pretense of
selflessness (with respect to employees, customers and
business partners) covering real disinterested exploitation
(on behalf of shares) is unlikely to suddenly see himself as
"in a position in which thought of self was to be renounced,
however hard the abnegation"" and voluntarily hand over
these hard-won gains of competitive practice to his principal.
If you can properly lie to your subordinates, why not lie to
your superior as well? Learning to be a rational maximizer
is simply incompatible with being a faithful, selfless agent.
In the end, the cynicism of the share value maximization
view must eat itself alive.
The principle commands
managers to abandon the ordinary ties of human solidarity:
to maximize profit, they must be prepared to sacrifice their
co-workers, their suppliers, and even the cities or
communities in which they operate. Successful managers
2

See generally, John C. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The

Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV 1, 98 (1986) (arguing that
the market for corporate control forced CEOs to abrogate an implicit
contract with middle managers).
Cf. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1103a (J.E.C. Welldon,
D.D. trans., MacMillian & Co. 1912) (350 B.C.E.) (stating that habit
creates character).
Meinhard,249 N.Y. at 468.
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learn to live in a world in which there is no loyalty and all
relationships are purely instrumental, lasting only so long as
they remain mutually beneficial.
Only the share
relationship is said to be different. But there is no good
explanation for why loyalty to shares should be real when
loyalty to all people is illusory. The rootless, commitmentless, value-less manager is unlikely to suddenly become
loyal, rooted and spiritual just because shares are at stake.
The share value maximization principle teaches
managers that they are acting properly only if they treat the
people around them as mere tools, to be used or discarded as
needed to fulfill the firm's share value maximization ends.
But if it is permissible, even required, to treat all the human
participants in a firm as tools, why are shares different?
Why not exploit them as well? This key route from share
value maximization to Enronitis, then, is straightforwardly
psychological. The profit principle is incompatible with the
selfless sacrifice for shares that it demands.
B.

Corporate Finance and the Specialness of Shares

The psychological difficulty of maintaining an extreme
lack of commitment in every aspect of professional life except
with regard to shares, of treating every corporate participant
but shares as a mere tool, and of competing at arm's-length
with every corporate participant but shares, is compounded
by the problem that managers are also taught that shares
are identical to all other corporate participants from which
they are supposed to be different. Modern corporate finance
theory-part of every MBA curriculum-teaches that shares,
like every other firm participant, are simply fungible
inputs.8 5
In particular, it implicitly contradicts naive
See, e.g., Armen A. Alehian & Harold Demsetz,

Production,

Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AMER. ECON REV. 777

(1972) (claiming that it is a "delusion" that firms have authority over its
inputs; rather, all firm decisions are made by "ordinary market
contracting"); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the
Firm, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1480 ("In a firm of bilateral contracts
between free market actors, both parties possess equal power to contract
someplace else.").
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theories of shares as "owners" of the firm that might, were
they plausible, give managers some justification for treating
shares differently from other factors of production.
1. Shares as Factors of Production
Start with the Dodge v. Ford view that shares are
different. In ordinary usage, the share-centered view of the
firm is conflated with the claim that the corporation should
maximize profit. Accounting conventions derive from and
reinforce this view by treating benefits to shares as profit
while the benefits to all other corporate participants are
treated as costs (with the anomalous exception of stock
option grants to employees). As the accountants portray the
firm, payments to shares (i.e., dividends)-unlike payment to
any other factor of production-do not reduce profits.
Moreover-in stark contrast to the legal reality-accounting
conventions portray shares as having the sole claim on
whatever is left over after other firm claimants are paid
("shareholders' equity").
Corporate finance teaches that this picture is false in a
way that resonates with the experience of any big company
manager."
From the publicly traded firm's perspective,
capital is just another factor of production. Firms need to
pay to obtain raw materials, they need to pay to obtain labor,
and they need to pay to obtain capital. To buy (or rent)
capital, they must pay either interest or dividends. On this
view, dividends are an expense and sales of shares are
simply a way of raising money, to a large extent fungible
with other methods of raising capital (such as retained
"6I
leave aside the problem of the former owner who takes the
company public while remaining manager. It is a well-known problem
that such managers are particularly apt to see the outside shareholders as,
at best, arm's-length suppliers to be exploited to the maximum possible
degree. For managers who built the company and formerly owned it, the
public shareholders are particularly likely to look like the purely fungible
suppliers of a cheap commodity I describe in the text. See, e.g., James
Surowiecki, Other People's Money, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2004, at 26
(describing Hollinger CEO Conrad Black's description of his shareholders'
role: "to hand over their money and keep their mouths shut").
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earnings or borrowing). Part of the job of the top managers
of the firm is to obtain capital in the cheapest way possible,
by shifting between retained earnings, bank borrowing,
bonds and equity sales according to the relative pricing of
those funding sources, in pursuit of the usual goal of
maximizing the returns to the firm.
This view, which is common in corporate finance circles
and is likely a daily part of most CFOs' decision-making
process, conflicts at the most fundamental level with the
share-centered view because it treats shares as a cost like all
others. Just as all other inputs to the firm should be given
as little as possible, so should shares. Indeed, for a manager
who is accustomed to financing the firm in the cheapest way
possible, offering gifts to shares may seem like a violation of
the profit maximization principle itself.
From the perspective of corporate managers and the
bankers who advise them, shares are essentially a way of
raising capital, largely interchangeable with other ways of
raising capital such as borrowing money or retaining
earnings (i.e., paying the various factors of production of the
firm less than the revenues from sale of their product). On
this "nexus of contracts" view of the firm, shares are merely
one role among many that make up the firm.87
To be sure, shareholders who purchase their shares in an
IPO contribute cash and some risk bearing services,
accepting returns that are closely tied to the success of the
company.8 8 But bond buyers also contribute cash to the firm,
and the value and returns of junk bonds fluctuate in close
connection with the fortunes of the company. Similarly,
employees, especially if they have developed company based
skills or commitments not easily marketable or transferable
elsewhere, if they have significant retirement savings in the
87

See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 81, at 417 (stating that in the "nexus of

contracts" theory of the firm, "hierarchy is irrelevant"); Lynn Stout, Bad &
Not So Bad Arguments for ShareholderPrimacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189
(2002) (clearly stating the argument that shareholders do not own public
corporations).
8' Of course, the actual shareholders at any given time are likely to
have purchased their shares in the secondary market and thus they may
not have contributed anything at all to the company.
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company's stock, if they are compensated based on companyseniority, or if they are paid in part in options or stock, also
find their fortunes closely tied to the company's and bear
much of its risk. Indeed, whenever labor markets are not
perfectly flexible, employees are likely to be the most closely
tied to the company of all: unlike either shareholders or
bondholders, they cannot diversify.
The largest source of investment capital in modern large
firms is retained earnings, not share or bond issuance. If the
firm is able to retain earnings, by definition it must be
paying its various factors of production less than it is able to
sell its product for. This suggests, however, that all the
factors of production have contributed to the firm's retained
surplus: not only have shares foregone dividends, but
employees have foregone raises, creditors have foregone
higher rates, citizen-taxpayers have foregone higher taxes,
and customers have foregone lower prices.
On the corporate finance view of the firm as a nexus of
contracts, there is no moral or economic reason to assume
that one of these factors has a stronger claim on the surplus
than the others. Neither the Marxist view that all value is
contributed by the employees or the obverse claim,
sometimes made in shareholder circles, that the
shareholders are the sole source of profits, makes much
sense. The corporate product is a joint effort of all the factors
of production, each one of which is likely to be a but-for cause
of the company's success.
Still, common sense suggests that shares usually will
have the weakest economic claim to the corporate surplus on
Public
corporate finance or nexus of contracts views.
shareholders, after all, are perfectly fungible providers of a
perfectly fungible commodity (cash) in a quite competitive
market. Of all the various contributors to the final corporate
product, they are the most easily replaced. It is hard to see
why an arm's-length contractor would ever pay them more
than the market price.
If shares are just factors of production, the share value
maximization norm implodes. That norm teaches managers
to treat factors of production as tools to be exploited, or at
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least given no more than necessary in arm's-length
negotiation. Predictably, some managers will apply precisely
the same logic to the shares themselves. What is sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander. If investors have agreed to
buy shares that have no legal right to a dividend, why should
they get one? To give them one would be a free gift, and the
maximization principle teaches managers that they should
not give gifts.
2. Managerial Agency in the Corporate Finance
World
At this point, the situation gets even worse. If managers
have learned to be maximizers, but reject the argument that
they must sacrifice themselves for the shares, for whom will
they maximize? The cynic's answer must be correct: share
value maximization produces cynics, and cynics work only for
themselves. All bonds of loyalty and mutual respect having
been broken, nothing is left for managers but to maximize
their own individual wealth before their retirement (or
firing) date. This is the logic of corruption well known to
students of failed governments: steal as much as possible
before the next group of reformers (or aspiring
corruptionists) push you out to do the same. For the cynic
trained in share value maximization, even the only value
permitted by that norm, the only loyalty left, will soon seem
just a tool. The new rule will be to maximize share value
only to the extent that it is useful for personal pocket lining.
Often, of course, increasing share value will be the best
way for managers to line their own pockets. It is easier to
take a big piece of pie when the pie is big and growing.
Similarly, often the most cynical and instrumental of
managers will find that it is instrumentally useful to create a
quality product or have happy employees. However, there is
no necessary connection. An illusion of a quality product will
often do just as well as an actual one, particularly in the
short term, and similarly, illusions of profits will often do
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just as well for a while.89 In the long run, of course, illusions
tend to be exposed, but chances are excellent that top
managers will be gone before the fictions are apparent even
to their authors.
3. The Ownership Metaphor
If shares are not different because they make a
contribution to the firm that is different in kind than other
factors of production, perhaps they are entitled to be the
special objects of managerial concern for another reason.
The traditional claim is that the shares "own" the firm and
therefore are entitled to have it be run for them.
Unfortunately, the reason shares need the ownership
metaphor to justify their claim to the corporate surplus is
precisely because, unlike owners, they lack the power to take
it on their own.
The ownership metaphor, meant to differentiate shares
from other corporate roles, is deeply implausible. In a public
firm, shareholders own their shares. But they have few of
the legal rights of owners of the firm, do not act like firm
owners and do not have the normal significance of owners in
the firm as a sociological entity. °
An owner of a fee simple absolute in real estate or the
holder of title to chattel has the rights (subject to general
See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1976), in which corporate managers successfully defended their
decision to characterize a transaction in a way which made the company
appear more profitable although it in fact made the company's expenses
rise (by increasing its tax liability). While one might imagine that a court
might simply hold that the decision to pay taxes voluntarily is
commendable and patriotic, in fact the court rested its decision solely on
the astonishing rationale offered by management: deceiving investors was
good for them.
o In their seminal study, Berle & Means recognized that the public
shareholders are not owners in any normal sense, but then created
decades of confusion by referring to them as "owners" nonetheless. See
generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991). See also Stout, supra note 87
(arguing that shareholders are not owners).
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legal regulation such as zoning or environmental laws) to
decide to what use her property shall be put, has the right to
refuse to use it in profit-maximizing ways or even to destroy
it. Neither a home-owner nor a closely-held business owner
has any duty to anyone to act in a way that an economist
would recognize as economically rational.
In contrast, shares have none of these rights with respect
to public corporations (so long as the company remains
public). Our system of corporate law and securities markets
has no mechanism by which a majority of shareholders could
direct (or authorize) the directors to change the use of the
corporation's property, place another value ahead of share
value maximization or even pursue profit in a particular
way." Rather, shares have only the rights to a pro rata
share of any distributions the corporate board chooses to
make, the right to vote for that board, and the right to
approve or reject certain changes in their rights proposed by
the board.
Not only do shares lack the rights of individual owners,
they lack even most collective rights. In practice, board
members are nominated by incumbent management and
usually elected without opposition. On the rare occasions
where opposition appears, the rules are anything but
democratic: management's candidates have full access to
corporate resources while opponents are financially on their
own.92 Even if they elect a board, shares have no right to
have the board act according to the wishes of the majority of
the shares or shareholders. Rather, board members have a
fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the shares
as constructed by the courts without regard for the expressed
desires of the shareholders, and that duty is enforceable by
even a single share.9"
91
92

See Greenwood, FictionalShareholders,supra note 55.
See, e.g., Levin v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y.

1967) (upholding incumbent management's use of corporate funds to solicit
proxies for its position in contested elections). Insurgents do have a right
to access to (or use of) the shareholder list under Exchange Act Rule 14a-7
and state law provisions, such as N.Y.B.C.L. § 624.
" Any shareholder may bring a suit for breach of fiduciary duty. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 327 (2004).
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Only if all shares act with one voice do shares have the
rights of owners. Accordingly, the one serious ownership
right that public shareholders have is the potential to sell
their shares to a single buyer, that is, to take the company
private. But since the development of the poison pill and its
statutory equivalents, shares no longer have the right even
to sell the company unilaterally. Prior board approval is
required for sale of all the shares just as it always was for
sale of the company."
Far from being owners, then, in the usual course shares
are just another input into the firm. As we saw above, they
are largely fungible with other financing sources. It is thus
hard to see why they should get something that others do
not.
Owners in a capitalist society justify their rights by their
function. As holders of the right to decide how property
should be used, they are potentially entrepreneurial decisionmakers. If there is anything that the shareholders of a
public firm are not, it is that. Indeed, the closest equivalent
to the entrepreneur in the public firm is the top managers
themselves, who are the ones to decide what risks to take. It
is a short ideological step, and an almost inevitable
psychological one, for managers who act like owners to begin
to view themselves as the owners in fact. Again, the strain
on the share-centered agency view of the managerial role, in
which managers are supposed to set aside their own
interests in favor of the shares, seems impossible to sustain.
4. The Diversification Problem
Additional pressure on the share-centered view of
managerial duty comes from another aspect of corporate
finance.
Shareholders in a modern publicly held firm
typically are diversified portfolios, the interests of which are
often contrary to the interests of individual firms in a
competitive market. (Diversified portfolios do not benefit
9' See Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls and Professors, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1037 (2002) (inventor of the poison pill describes and defends it).
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when a portfolio company out-competes another portfolio
company, particularly if the competition results, as it is
supposed to, in collateral benefit to non-publicly traded
consumers.)
Moreover, while shareholders do not own the corporation
in any meaningful sense, they do have most of the usual
panoply of ownership rights with respect to their shares.
Shareholders, that is, actually own shares. It is shares that
they buy and sell-often with considerations other than the
interests of the company represented by the shares they are
trading. Every shareholder who buys or sells based on a
view that the market has temporarily misvalued a firm's
securities is acting in a way that is not congruent with the
interests of the company itself.
Shareholders do not consistently act as if they have the
interests of the company at heart. Purely fungible providers
of a purely fungible commodity, inputs like every other
corporate participant, lacking the usual attributes of
entrepreneurship or ownership including legal rights to use
and control the assets, dehumanized and deracinated by the
market and the legal demands of best interest analysis, the
shares don't look like the company or behave as if they had
its interests at heart. No wonder it is difficult for company
managers to maintain the fiction that the shares are the
company.
C.

The Highly Paid Executive Problem

As is well known, top manager pay packages have soared
in the last several decades, reaching astronomical levels
previously enjoyed only by entrepreneurial owner/founders
and their descendants." By the logic of the share value
" See, e.g., Piketty & Saez, supra note 66, at fig. 18 (showing that
between 1970 and 1999, a period in which average U.S. salaries were
virtually unchanged in real terms, the annual pay of the average CEO of
the top 100 U.S. corporations increased from roughly $1.25 million to
almost $40 million); id. at fig. 21 (showing that by 1998 the income share
of the top .1% of American taxpaying households was almost as high as it
was in the Roaring Twenties); id. at figs. 6-7 (showing that while in 1916
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maximization model, this high pay suggests that CEOs are
more important and more deserving of high pay than ever
before. For when CEOs are seen as outsiders-factors of
production and arm's-length market participants who are to
be negotiated with according to the norms of the
marketplace-there are only two possibilities: any time they
do not deserve to be fired, they deserve a raise. The
reasoning is slightly paradoxical but psychologically clear.
Under the share value maximization principle, managers
are directed to view themselves as selfless agents acting only
on behalf of the shares. In their mission to maximize share
value, they should treat all employees, including themselves,
as mere means to that overriding end; they, like all corporate
participants, are valued not for themselves or as ends or
values in themselves but merely as tools to increase share
value. Perversely, the view of managers as obligated to
exploit themselves can lead to an enormous over-valuation of
managers.
A profit maximizing firm treating employees purely
instrumentally will always seek to pay employees less than
they contribute to the firm. Managers act as fiduciaries for
the firm. At the same time, they are employees and tools to
the end of firm profit maximization. Thus, in their fiduciary
roles, managers are directed to treat themselves in their
employee role as tools.
As fiduciaries, the only reason that can justify managers'
decision to pay any employee (including themselves)
anything at all is that the employee contributes more to the
firm than the pay. So if manager-fiduciaries are doing their
jobs, they are paying manager-employees less than they are
contributing to the firm.
But this basic pay principle works in both directions. In a
market relationship, any party to the bargain is entitled to
attempt to obtain full value for their contribution. At
equilibrium, indeed, the price of each firm input (including
the top .1% received most of their income from capital, in 1998, they
received 60% from wages: CEOs have overtaken the heirs of the robber
barons as our economic elite).
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managers) should equal its marginal contribution.
So
manager-employees are entitled to demand they be paid
their full contribution to the firm.
Combining the two roles, it follows that either managers
are not doing their jobs, or they are paid less than they
contribute to the firm. Put differently, either they should be
fired, or they deserve a raise. Either the CEO is contributing
more to the firm than he (rarely she) is taking from it, in
which case the firm is exploiting him and he is fulfilling his
fiduciary obligation (in his role as an agent of the firm) but
clearly is entitled to demand a raise (in his personal capacity
as a free-market free agent). Or, he is not pulling his weight,
he is exploiting the firm, and he is not merely presumptively
incompetent and overpaid, but also dishonest-in breach of
his duty as an agent and a professional. In short, he should
be fired summarily. The logical conclusion is simple: if the
CEO does not deserve to be fired, he deserves to be paid
more.
Presumably, ordinary processes of cognitive dissonance
will prevent most CEOs from concluding that they deserve to
be fired; instead, they will conclude that they deserve an
ever-increasing share of the corporate pie.
The same
processes of cognitive dissonance will lead boards to the
same conclusion: if they are not making a major mistake or
even breaching their own fiduciary duty, then they have
chosen a CEO who is contributing more than his pay. Either
he (and the board which failed by hiring and retaining him)
should be removed, or he deserves the raise he is requesting.
The model here is similar to but more dramatic than the
well-understood way in which the reform of having CEO
salaries set by independent committees employing
independent consultants led to rapid increases in CEO
salaries: any board that hires a mediocre manager to run its
company is surely derelict in its duty. By the logic of
cognitive dissonance, it follows that a board must believe
that the CEO it employs is not mediocre. Otherwise it would
be obliged to fire him. But if he is not mediocre, it would be
insulting to pay him a mediocre salary. Similarly, in times of
transition, offering a mediocre salary to the newcomer

No. 3:773]

ENRONITIS

suggests that the board is seeking mediocrity, which would
be a dereliction of duty. Accordingly, board members who
wish to believe that they are acting in good faith appear to
have only three choices: pay the CEO an above average
salary, fire the CEO, or resign. When all boards seek to pay
their CEOs above average salaries, inflation is a highly
predictable result. 6
Thus, the share value maximization model invites CEOs,
acting in good faith on behalf of the firm, to see themselves
as underpaid. Simultaneously, it invites directors to see
themselves as required to pay above-average salaries to top
managers. At the same time again, it tells CEOs, in their
personal capacities, that their personal interests are, and
should be, opposed to the firm's interests. They are, after all,
mere factors of production that the firm should exploit. But
that also means that, as contracting parties, they are
entitled to exploit the firm if they can get away with it. In
most firms, I imagine, the former processes are enough to
make CEOs rich beyond imagination. In a few, apparently
including WorldCom and Enron, the latter encourages
outright theft.
D. Share Centeredness Opposed to Team Spirit
The share value maximization ethos treats all the people
with whom managers have day-to-day relations as
competitive opponents. On this view-given its clearest
academic representation in the metaphor of the firm as a
"moment in the market"-the firm is imagined to be
composed of self-interested market participants whose only
interest in other human beings is to use them to maximize
See, e.g., THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST &
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, PART I, ExEcuTIvE COMPENSATION (Sept. 17, 2002) at

6, 10, available at http://www.conference-board.orgfPDF-free/756.pdf
(disapproving prior recommended practice of "benchmarking" CEO
salaries due to ever rising compensation resulting from attempts to beat
the average); Susan Stabile, Viewing Executive Compensation Through a
Partnership Lens, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 153, 173 (2000) (describing
salary spiral resulting from independent salary consultants).
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their own wealth. Perhaps it is an exaggeration to say that
"in the groves of their academy, at the end of every vista, you
see nothing but the gallows."9 7 But certainly in these groves,
there are no office romances. Not even friendships.
Contrary to this individualist ideology of mutual
exploitation, firms in fact have many team-like and
communitarian aspects, and, indeed, successful firms
generally are quite unlike moments in the market. While
this is not the place to argue the point, if the key to success
were to be market-like, firms would be out-competed by real
markets, which are always more market-like than the most
market-like firm.98
Most Americans spend a good part of their waking day at
work. Workplaces, therefore, are likely to be major sources
of our social lives, relationship building and communities.
Not all capitalist labor is alienated, notwithstanding Marx,
the share value maximization principle and the best efforts
of many human resources departments.9 9 Many of us make
97

BURKE, supra note 72, at 113.

98

See OSCAR WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 132,

137-40 (1985) (describing failure of high-powered incentives inside firms).
Enron seems to have taken the idea of firm as market to unheard of
lengths, with predictably poor results. See, e.g., BRYCE, supra note 11, at
129 (describing "rank and yank" systems' effect on transforming
cooperation into competition); Toobin, supra note 15 (similar analysis).
'" Marx makes a distinction between the market and the workplace
that, like the arm's-length vs. agency distinction I make, emphasizes the
differences between the two spheres. However, with his usual heavy
handed irony, he describes the market sphere as "a very Eden of the
innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and
Bentham" in order to emphasize that the rights of the market disappear in
the working relationship, which he describes as unmitigated oppression,
closely echoing Adam Smith's discussion of pin making. KARL MARX,
CAPITAL 195-6 (Modem Library ed., 1992) (1887); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

(Modem Library

ed.,1994) (1776) (describing how the division of labor that efficiently
produces pins also diminishes the human capacity of the pin makers).
Ultimately, both of Marx's characterizations are not illuminating with
respect to the modem workplace and labor market. For my purposes, the
workplace has aspects of attractive human community not seen in Marx or
Smith, and the most important aspect of the market is not the "innate
rights of man" but that, for good and ill, it is impersonal.
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friends at work, see our fellow workers as team members
engaged in a common enterprise, and identify with the
common project as our own project. All this is natural,
normal and usually for the best. Human beings are social
animals who seem to seek out opportunities for community
building.
Most often, team spirit and community are also helpful to
the success of the firm. When people believe they are part of
a team, they work harder, demand less in return and enjoy
themselves more. Members of a team pull together for the
common goal, setting aside individual egos and needs (at
least outside of NBA basketball) in order to focus their
cooperation in competing with the other side. Soldiers,
perhaps the quintessential team members, risk their own
lives to protect fellow team members (most personally, their
squad members; more abstractly, their fellow countrymen).
In risking their lives, they show the highest form of altruism
within the team-no profit maximizer would ever be willing
to give up life itself for someone else's benefit.
1. Team Competitiveness
At the same time, the internal altruism of the team is
usually accompanied by intense competition with non-team
members, generally seen as opponents in a zero-sum game.
Soldiers and football players alike use their intra-group
cooperation and altruism in order to attack the enemy, often
dehumanized or devalued as those jerks on the other side of
the stadium, or worse. Nationalists combine love of the
nation with hatred, or at least intolerance, of non-nationals;
patriots are willing to sacrifice for the good of the country,
but understand that good to be in competition with the good
of the neighbors. We pull together in order to pull ahead of
them.
In the corporate world, team competitiveness is reflected
in the war-like metaphors of salesmen and the takeover
world-hostile takeovers, barbarians at the gate, white
knights, scorched earth and poison pill defense-as well as
the zero-sum games of market share competition and the
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fundamental market rule of "exploit thy business partner" or
take advantages when the opportunity offers.
2. Team Pathology
Team spirit is a good so powerful that team players with
strong communities seem to live longer and healthier lives. °0
Yet it can easily become pathological: good citizenship easily
moves from patriotism to nationalism to xenophobia or
worse. Intra-group solidarity and mutual aid can often be
accompanied by extreme disregard of larger norms or the
claims and humanity of non-group members.
In the
corporate context, team pathology is common enough,
manifesting itself in cheating and law violation. Corporate
team members can become so concerned about winning for
the team that they disregard external norms requiring
solidarity with larger groups of people. Driven to win,
corporate players begin to feel corporate solidarity justifies
cheating customers, evading national taxes, regulatory
schemes, or environmental laws. In short, teams play dirty.
Some observers have not discerned much team spirit at
Enron itself. The "rank and yank" system of ranking all
employees every six months and then firing the bottom
fifteen percent led to a good deal of internal backstabbing
and corruption.''
Nevertheless, much of Enronitis, and
corporate malfeasance at more typical firms, seems to relate
to this pathology of competitive team spirit: outsiders don't
count; rules are made to be broken; winning is all that
matters. One may disregard the interests of Californians, for
example, because the mission is to promote the interests of
Enron.
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See, e.g.,

RICHARD WILKINSON, MIND THE GAP: HIERARCHIES, HEALTH

11-13 (2001) (reporting that social cohesion
increases public health; increased inequality worsens health of lower
status individuals while more equal societies have better health, largely
because equality correlates with cohesion).
AND HuMAN EVOLUTION
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See BRYCE, supra note 11, at 127-29.
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3. In Praise of Teams
Human communities, the teams I referred to above, often
couple extreme altruism and mutual concern within the
group with a striking lack of concern or hostility to those
outside the group. The two processes, altruism on the one
hand and competitive hostility or arm's-length indifference
on the other, seem tightly linked in our psychology. Many
people have fond memories of war (or a peace movement) as
a time when ordinary people came together in a common
enterprise for the common good, escaping the alienating
individuality of ordinary times, even though the common
enterprise was little more than hostility to some other
group.

In the corporate context, forming the team is one of the
key advantages of firms over markets. Markets price better,
can incorporate more information than any plan, and have
obvious and precise motivators. Firms generally blur and
dull those mechanisms and incentives-for example, by
unlinking pay from direct measures of productivity, quality,
0 3 Team spirit, with
or demand for the individual's products."
its solidarity and internal altruism as well as its fierce
competitiveness towards outsiders, can be the tool that
overcomes the inherent limitations of command and control
market displacement, thereby allowing firms to out-compete
0
spot markets.1'
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Wilkinson reports that civilian health improved in Britain during

both World Wars, despite the economic shortages. WILKINSON, supra note
100, at 12.
'o3 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 98; LAURENCE J. PETER &
RAYMOND HULL, THE PETER PRINCIPLE (William Morrow & Co. 1969);
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996) (each describing
aspects of problematic internal incentive structures of firms).
" R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)
(arguing that firms appear where there are cost advantages over other
alternatives); Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (discussing cost advantages of teams).
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4. The Instability of Teams in the Share Value
Maximization World
The importance of intra-group team spirit in corporate
enterprise is no news: it is a commonplace element of
managerial training. But the share value maximization
principle puts a strange twist on team spirit. It teaches
managers that the humans who work for the corporation are
not its team but rather the opponents.
Managers who accept the commonplace idea that team
spirit works and also accept that their job is to maximize
share value are bound to live a double life. In order to
maximize share value, they must convince their fellow
employees that they are all in the game together, part of a
common enterprise, and sacrificing for a common goal. But
the game and the goal is to extract the most value out of the
supposed team members and give it away to someone else, a
fictional bystander not even present at the game. At the
same time that managers are building team spirit, they are
required to be looking around for opportunities to shaft their
fellow team members.
The key advantage of team spirit for rational managers is
that team players are not rational maximizers.
Team
members give towards the common goal without expecting
precise compensation for every act. They are motivated not
by self-interest but by community feeling-positive towards
fellow community members and negative towards outsiders.
But this very altruism opens them to exploitation by a
supposed team member who is really an opponent. When
someone is giving their all, they are particularly open to
being taken all the way.
Managers, then, are caught in a double game. The share
value maximization principle tells them that their real team
is the shares. They are meant to compete with everyone else
in order to win one for the shares. To serve their true
masters, they must convince their fellow employees,
customers and suppliers that they are all on the same team;
that is, that they are engaged in a common enterprise for a
common goal. Or, in other words, they must show that they,
as managers, are not serving their true masters. Then, they
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must betray the team. Surely only the most extreme of
cynics can succeed in this role.
But a manager who has learned to betray those he or she
works with every day, pretending to be their teammate while
constantly seeking opportunities to exploit their communal
good feeling, is a manager who has learned to be dishonest, a
dissembler, a traitor to his small community, and a breaker
of trust. Why, having betrayed his trust to the team that he
works with every day, should he remain loyal to a fictional
shareholder that doesn't even exist except as a legal
abstraction or an investment portfolio?
The share value maximization scheme teaches managers
to betray the people with whom they have relationships in
order to serve their ultimate master.
It should be no
surprise that some learn this lesson well enough to betray
the master as well. Double agents, in the end, work only for
themselves.
In short, share value maximization teaches that the real
team is the shares and their servants are the managers; but
enterprise success depends on creating a team composed of
employees and often customers and suppliers as well. The
two team notions are incompatible. The latter requires
mutual concern and trust. The former constructs members
of the firm as opponents, to be treated somewhere between
arm's-length according to the norms of the market, in which
mutual concern is absent, and active competitive hostility, in
a zero-sum game in which every gain for one side is a loss for
the other. The one requires trust; the other bars it.
Enronitis is a predictable pathological result. The team
breaks down into a one-on-one competition of every man to
himself and the devil take the hindmost. °5 All that remains
of the team spirit is the disregard of rules, the desire to win
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Some commentators have argued that large gaps between CEO and

ordinary employee salaries harm corporate spirit and therefore
productivity. See, e.g., Jay Lorsch, CEO Pay, 70 HARv. Bus. REV. 132
(1992) (large pay gaps highlight intra-group competition and weaken
claims that all employees are on the same team).
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at all costs, and the depersonalization of opponents, now
understood as everyone.
V.

POLICING SHARE-CENTEREDNESS:
THE REFORMS

Many of the proposed post-Enron reforms are steps in the
right direction, although taken as a whole they seem
unlikely to solve the problem. A few, however, may well
accentuate the pathology, much as the independent
compensation committee and tax-law insistence that salaries
over $1 million be performance-based worsened the problem
of overpaid executives.0
A.

Disclosure

First, improved disclosure is a good thing, if not
necessarily for the reasons usually given.
The prices of publicly traded stocks are related to the
profits of the underlying corporation, but as anyone who
followed the market on its way up and down in the last few
years is aware, the connection can be very loose. Stock
markets often price shares based on expected earnings (or on
expected price gains resulting from expectations of expected
earnings), placing greater weight on trends and patterns
than on the current absolute numbers and increasing or
decreasing stock prices disproportionately for changes in
trends.1 °7 This provides cynical managers a great incentive
to massage the numbers or even lie. A few well-timed
106

I.R.C. § 162(m) (2004). See also Stabile, supra note 30 (discussing

excessive compensation); Ryan Miske, Note: Can't Cap Corporate Greed:
Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation
Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1680 (2004) (describing
failed history of tax-code provisions as intended maximums became de
facto minimums and tax-favored "performance based" pay became
authorization for enormous stock-option grants); Susan Stabile, Is There a
Role for the Law in Policing Executive Compensation, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
81 (1998) (policy analysis of relevant tax code provisions).
107 See generally, ROBERT SHILLER,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000)
(describing excess volatility of stock markets, including trend chasing
behavior).
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disclosures can cause a terrific price increase (or avoid a
decrease) and allow top managers, who are nearly always
near the end of their employment, to cash out before the
truth emerges.' °8
Moreover, even managers who have not succumbed to
ultimate cynicism may convince themselves that they are
doing their jobs by managing reported earnings. The share
value maximization ideology perversely suggests that
corporations ought to manage their disclosures in the way
that maximizes market valuation of their securities, rather
than in the way that most accurately reflects their
underlying condition. If the goal is to increase the value of
shares, and any means will do, why not deceive shareholders
for their own good? (Of course, deception cannot be to the
good of actual shareholders as a group, but it can effectively
increase share price for some period of time, and the latter
may be the more salient effect even to managers still trying
to act as good-faith agents.')
Much market behavior seems to be the result of this
perverse incentive. Because the market is quite sensitive to
changes in disclosure, companies find that they can affect
stock price as much by manipulating disclosure as by the
more difficult task of out-competing their competition. If
reported earnings can be increased or reported debt
decreased by changes in financing or reporting or strategic
acquisitions, the share value maximization ideology suggests
that managers ought to do so, even if there is no real
economic justification for the action.
The basic problem is managing the company according to
the whims and prejudices of the stock market; reforming
accounting rules or forcing CEOs to swear that they have not
lied will not change that. However, accounting anomalies
make a bad problem worse. If companies can create reported
earnings by "round trip" trades, they will waste social
resources and distort their reported earnings by making
108See, e.g., supranotes 17, 18, 23 and 26.
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1976).

See Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
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those trades. If executive stock options have no effect on the
company's reported financials, they will be used more. If
accounting for merger rules allow the combined company to
have higher reported earnings than did the parts of which it
was made, companies will combine even when no efficiencies
result.
The reforms, of course, will create new and sometimes odd
market incentives. If stock options are reported as an
expense at the time of issuance based on their Black-Scholes
value, and companies then correct the accounting when they
are actually cashed in, the effect may be to smooth earnings
oddly. When stock prices are down, options will expire
unused, and the company will be able to report "earnings"
resulting from reversing the too-high estimate of the cost of
the options. Marking to market periodically would lessen
the jumps in earnings but not change the effect of generating
"earnings" for no reason other than stock price drops.
Overall, surely honesty is better than deception. The
fierce resistance to disclosing options suggests that
executives, at least, believe that the market responds to the
reported bottom line numbers rather than the underlying
reality or even the total information publicly available
(which these disclosure reforms will not change), and it
seems most likely that they are right."'
11

See, e.g., Melone, supra note 31 (describing FASB attempts to

mandate disclosure of stock based compensation as an expense and the
accompanying political opposition). The current FASB rule, Financial
Accounting Standard No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation
(Oct. 1995), available at http://www.fasb.orgpdf/fas123.pdf, requires
disclosure (in a footnote) of the Black-Scholes value of option granted, but
does not require expensing. Thus, analysts have available all of the
information necessary to recalculate profits with options expensed.
Nonetheless, both sides appear to believe-contrary to the strictures of an
efficient market-that expensing (or not) matters. Kevin Murphy, in
contrast, has argued that both compensation committees and executives
constantly value options at considerably less than their market value as
predicted by the Black-Scholes formula. See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining
Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of
Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 857-68 (2002). If Murphy is correct,
the gap between private and public value would be another reason for
executives to resist disclosure.

No. 3:773]

ENRONITIS

Moreover, the end-stages of Enronitis involve deliberate
deception and outright fabrication. Reforms that seek to
increase the independence of auditors, demand stronger
audit committees, require rotation of audit partners,
separate auditors from consultants, and the like, seem quite
likely to catch more fraud and perhaps even limit some of the
semi-bad faith game-playing. Increasing nominal criminal
penalties seems less likely to have any effect. These reforms
do not, however, change the underlying incentives to cheat,
so we should expect that as we close up some obvious routes,
clever cynics will find others.
More disclosure than is currently on the table might help
even more. For example, apparently some public companies
report one set of earnings to the SEC for public disclosure,
showing high profits, and another different set of books to
the Internal Revenue Service, showing low profits, for tax
reasons, which the IRS does not make fully public."' Under
this system, managers serving the share value maximization
norm predictably will stretch accounting conventions as far
as possible in both fora, with only the good faith of managers
and the limited resources of the governmental agencies
standing in the way of powerful incentives to outright fraud.
Private market incentives to exaggerate are limited only by
governmental enforcement.
Reversing the rule would reverse the incentives and
produce better results. If the IRS revealed the numbers
submitted to it, or if the SEC ruled that double bookkeeping
is prima facie evidence of a fraud on the marketplace,
companies might have some reason to seek a single set of
numbers that accurately represented the economic
functioning of the firm. Even if that is too optimistic, at a
minimum managers would seek to present a single set of
profit numbers defensible in both fora. Instead of pushing to
the limits of the law, companies might seek to live by the
spirit of at least one of the two systems.
Finally, disclosure is important well beyond the narrow
conceptions of securities law. Markets often prevent profit" See Johnston, supra note 32.
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maximizing companies from acting in socially valuable ways
even when consumers would be willing to pay private fees for
Thus, companies might well be able to charge
public goods.'
higher prices for products with lower associated pollution or
fewer social externalities. Not all consumers free ride all the
time. But consumers are unlikely to decide voluntarily to
contribute towards maintaining the commons if they cannot
even tell if the higher price is associated with greater social
responsibility. Companies required to disclose the pollution
associated with a product on its label, or to explain the
testing they have done or not done, or to detail the
externalities associated with their processes, or to state the
wages they pay in their factories abroad, might well find that
the consumer markets would reward efforts to behave in
more socially acceptable ways, especially if a securities-like
private right of action gave companies and consumers some
assurance that false disclosures stand a good chance of being
quickly and punitively disclosed.
In short, corporate disclosure and transparency is
important well beyond the stock market. Corporations are
part of our collective governance structure. As citizens, we
must know what they are up to if we are to intelligently
evaluate how to control them-both externally through
regulation and internally through corporate law and market
processes. The stock market, consumer markets, and the
general political process depend on full disclosure.113
1
1

See Coffee, supra note 56.
For this reason, as well as the reasons discussed in Greenwood,

Essential Speech, supra note 38, current doctrine regarding corporate
constitutional rights is backwards. Corporations should no more be
constitutionally protected from public view than should other
governmental agencies. Rather than possessing a Fourth Amendment
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures that can
be used to foil governmental regulation, corporations should be subject to a
sunshine principle along the lines of the Freedom of Information Act.
Compare, e.g., Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897)
(granting corporation 4th Amendment rights against searches and
seizures on the (clearly incorrect) ground that this is equivalent to
protecting the rights of citizens whose interest the corporation purports to
serve) with Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-81, 579
(1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) and Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
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B. Independent Directors
There has been a good deal of discussion of continuing
and accentuating the reforms of the last decade, primarily by
increasing the number of independent directors (marginally
tightening the definition of independence to exclude some
former employees, contractual beneficiaries of the company
or relatives who might be considered independent today) and
by increasing the number of consultants used by audit,
hiring and compensation committees. 14
The model outlined in this essay suggests that these
reforms are unlikely to work as expected. If independent
directors and their consultants view themselves as working
for the shares or fictional shareholders, they will simply
increase the perversities of the share value maximization
model. By demanding that managers conform to the model,
they will accentuate its incoherence. Managers will be
driven to exploit their corporate team members even more,
thus leading former team members to see themselves instead
as free agents. Top managers attempting selfless selfishness
will sink into self-interested cynicism.
Corporations
attempting to maximize share value will still find that often
the easiest way to do that is to show Wall Street what it
wants to see, regardless of whether it is what otherwise
would make business sense. Top managers will, after a brief
slowdown during the current scandals, continue to increase
their share of the take, as the ineluctable logic of Lake
Wobegon drives consultants and independent directors to
conclude that they must pay above-average employees aboveaverage salaries, and the agency principle requires that they
convince themselves that their overpaid executives are
contributing ever more to the firm as they take more from it.
The reality is that most independent directors are not
particularly independent, and that seems unlikely to change.
Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (both rejecting
view that corporations should be entitled to constitutional protection
against the citizenry or government).
114 See supra text accompanying note 48.
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For good reason, consultants and incumbent managers alike
are likely to look for other CEOs." 5 No one else, after all, is
likely to have the expertise to police managers. But CEOs
sitting on each other's boards are unlikely to criticize their
peers too stringently. In any event, even if they had the
inclination, directors rarely have the time or information
necessary for serious review of company managers (and this
problem is likely to be even worse for directors who are not
themselves senior managers elsewhere). Thus, directors,
nominally independent or not, are not likely to stand in the
way of any but the most egregious managerial abuses.
The point of this essay is that truly independent directors,
if they are or view themselves as answerable to the portfolios
or fictional shares, will just make the problems worse.
Enronitis ends in betrayal of the shares, but it begins in
share-centeredness itself. Increasing share-centeredness will
not cure this disease.
VI. RECONCEPTUALIZING CORPORATE LAW:
MAKING SPACE FOR CITIZENS
A more effective reform program must begin by
recognizing the perversity of the share value maximization
model and offering an alternative ideology of corporate
governance. But it cannot end there. The selfish share may
be a legally constructed fiction, but the law and our stock
market have given it enormous market power to enforce its
fictionalized, constructed will. Directors and managers have
only limited ability to unilaterally reject the demands of the
share value centered model before the market, as currently
regulated, will oust them. Moreover, the easiest reformsshifting power from the market to managers or boards they
effectively dominate-are more likely to empower the truly
cynical among managers, the solo players who have lost all
social constraints, than they are to create a more desirable
...See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck et. al, ManagerialPower and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
751, 771 (2002) (discussing social ties of directors to CEOs and likelihood
of common interests); JAY WILLIAM LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES (1989)

(discussing board room composition).
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corporate ethos. If we free managers from shares, the most
likely immediate result is that they will steal more freely.
A.

Corporation as Polis: An Alternative Ideology of
Corporate Governance

For a start, we need an alternative metaphor to the
corporation as its shares, and a different explanation of the
purpose and reality of public corporations. Hobbes proposed
to end his war of all against all by characterizing the state as
a corporation." 6 I propose to reverse the process, and
recharacterize the corporation as a polis, a community of all
its human affiliates, not the shares.
The advantages of the metaphor of the corporation as a
quasi-municipality or quasi-state go well beyond the
probability that it would induce law faculties to seek political
theorists or moral philosophers rather than law-&economists to staff their corporate law curriculum.
1. Polis to Politicians
Principally,
the
polis
metaphor,
like
earlier
"managerialist" understandings of the public corporation,
emphasizes the common enterprise of the various corporate
participants. Corporate managers instead of conceiving of
themselves as selfless, unsituated rational maximizers could
rather see themselves as statesmen, promoting the common
good of all corporate participants, and, in our multiplesovereigned system, as participants in the American
governance system required to promote the good of all
citizens.
On this model, it is clear that the corporate team extends
well beyond the shares. It would, therefore, offer a rationale
116

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 106-18 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett

Publishing Co., Inc. 1994) (1660) (describing commonwealth as "artificial
...covenant"); THOMAS HOBBES, ELEMENTS OF THE LAw 167 (J.C.A. Gaskin
ed., Oxford University Press 1994) (1640) (analogizing body politic to
corporation). Cf. BURKE, supra note 72 ("Nations themselves are such
corporations").
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for acting for the good of corporate participants as ends in
themselves, rather than doing so simply because treating
them in an apparently good way is the best way to extract
more out of them. But given the vague limits to "corporate
stakeholders" in a firm that, understood as a nexus of
contracts and externalities, lacks determinate or firm
boundaries, the polis metaphor offers a rationale for
managers to consider the public good generally, even beyond
the narrower interests of corporate participants.
This broader conception of the managerial/director role is
not an unmitigated good. Statesmanship is difficult. Many
aspirants to the title have been cynical charlatans or selfinterested deluders (even self-deluders). No doubt many
managers will be able to explain to their own satisfaction
why the common good requires precisely their private good.
Moreover, the public good is often controversial, and there is
no reason whatsoever to think that unelected corporate
managers, or directors nominally elected on a "one share, one
vote" basis, will reflect in their views the divisions of the
citizenry as a whole. Managerialism is a poor substitute for
democracy.
Still, unlike the reigning share-centered
ideology, working for the good of all corporate participants
does not require managers to take inconsistent positions,
play cynical double games, or deliberately lull people into
trusting them when they know they will be required to take
advantage of whatever trust they achieve.
2. The Struggle Over Surplus
The corporation as polis also emphasizes the openendedness of the struggle over corporate surplus. In this
way, it is quite different from the older managerial views,
which often seemed to conceal the possibility of conflicts
within the corporation under a veneer of professionalism.
The polis metaphor is meant to emphasize that there is no
"scientific," neutral, or professional objective solution to the
problem faced by managers. The issues are value laden, not
professional: what kind of society we wish to be or how to
mediate our conflicting values, not efficient administration.
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Share-centered models define profit as what is left over
after all corporate factors other than shares have been paid,
and insist that all those corporate factors be paid as little as
possible. The corporation as polis matches economic reality
more closely. In the polis model, corporations can outcompete markets only when the combined contributions of all
the corporate factors of production (including labor as well as
investment capital, whether in the form of debt, equity or
retained earnings) produce more in cooperation than they
would in market competition. That excess is the corporate
surplus, and it is available to be given to any factor of
production, none of which has an a priori exclusive claim to
it.
On this understanding of corporate surplus, the surplus is
called profit if it is retained by the corporation or paid out to
shares. If it is paid out to bondholders, it is called attractive
interest rates; if it is paid out to employees, it is called decent
working conditions, good benefits, competitive wages/salary
or hard-earned executive stock options; if it is paid out to
consumers, it is called every day low pricing; to the
government, taxes; to suppliers, high prices; to stockholders
of other companies, investment bankers and lawyers,
acquisition costs; to architects and builders, a landmark
headquarters; to the eco-system, ecological responsibility.
Like the apocryphal Aleut languages with thirty-five words
for snow, we have many words for corporate surplus. For
political and economic purposes, however, the distinctions
are not as important as the commonality. This is money that
is available for someone to take and no one "owns" it until
the struggle to allocate it has concluded.
3. Politics, Not Administration
Third, the political metaphor emphasizes the political
nature of the decisions that must be made. Corporations are
not only about increasing share value. They are also about
creating jobs for employees and suppliers, and those jobs
consist not only of paychecks but also of quality of life and
quality
of work issues:
relationships,
individual
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empowerment, self-improvement and education, health and
safety, hours that allow for families, movement and stability
in our various communities, support in sickness and old age
and for dependents. Corporations also exist to beautify our
cities, to provide products for consumers, to support
charities, to enhance and not merely destroy our
environment.
The share-centered view tells managers that these
concerns are illegitimate except when they are illusions.
Thus, on the share-centered view, corporate charity is
improper unless it is really advertising designed to increase
share returns rather than to accomplish a charitable
Working conditions, wages and retirement
purpose.'17
benefits are just costs to the corporation, justifiable only if
they induce workers to work harder or stick around longer
and that in turn increases returns to shares. Even abiding
by the law is defensible mainly because it is instrumentally
useful in maximizing profit. As Friedman famously put it,
"the business of business is business."1 8 All other values
must be imposed forcibly on business by enforceable
regulation.
In contrast, on the polis view, the inhuman and uncivil
claims of selfish shares can easily be rejected inside the firm.
Improving working conditions is a good thing because it is a
good thing, not because it is a subterfuge to extract more out
of employees. Managers who cause their corporations to
contribute to social needs are fulfilling their roles as trustees
for major accumulations of social wealth, not stealing from
shares. To be sure, firms can do none of these things unless
they generate enough income to cover the expenses, but

17

See, e.g., A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)

(upholding charitable contribution on ground that it is really selfinterested).
118 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept 13, 1970, at 32 ("There is only
one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the game").
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there is a difference between a constraint and a goal.'19 The
share-centered vision has the world backwards. Far from all
of us existing to make shares worth more, the only reason a
decent capitalist society allows some shareholders to become
indecently rich is because the market is a critical part of
improving working conditions and fulfilling social needs.
Those are not the means, they are the ends; it is not us who
are the tools but the shares.
B. The Democratic Deficit in Corporate Governance
Finally, the view of corporation as polis places front and
center the democratic deficit of our current corporate
governance system. Externally, corporate governance law
largely comes from Delaware. It is not even formally
approved by the citizens whom it governs, few of whom vote
in Delaware. Internally, corporations are governed by
managers who are answerable to boards elected, formally at
least, by shares on a basis of dollar proportionality. This is,
in political terms, a "herrendemocracy" in which the
"herren"-the elite group that adopts democratic norms
among its own members while exploiting non-voting
inhabitants-are not even people but dollars.'
...Indeed, sometimes working to make the world better can also
redound to private profit. Bruce D. Butterfield, Test by Fire: The Story of
Malden Mills, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 1996, at Al (recounting that after

1995 fire, Malden Mills decided to retain all employees during rebuilding).
Although Malden Mills stated that its decision was not based on profitmaximization calculations, it appears to have redounded to the benefit of
the company, as sales of its Polartec soared and the unionized plant was
strike-free. One shouldn't over emphasize this point: Malden Mills has
since filed for bankruptcy. See Marianne Jennings, Smart Money, WASH.
POST, Aug. 25, 2002, at B7 (interview with CEO and owner Aaron
Feuerstein in which he denies that bankruptcy was related to fire and
aftermath). Curiously, even though Malden Mills is closely held, at least
one business ethicist claimed that Feuerstein's decision to retain his
employees was unethical because it violated the profit maximization
principle (and without offering any evidence that in fact the costs to the
firm did exceed the benefits). Id.
120 I have discussed the varieties of democratic governance at greater
length in Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty, supra
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Managers who are expected to manage on behalf of the
entire corporation and possibly the public at large, not just
its shares, ought to be answerable to the entire corporation
and the public at large, not just its shares.
Bringing the public at large into the corporate governance
system may be the easier part. First, it requires ending the
bizarre choice of law regime under which managers (with
share approval) get to choose the corporate law that will
govern them. Instead, we should have a genuinely federalist
system, in which different states govern corporations under
their jurisdiction in substantially different ways-and no
state purports to govern corporations that exist primarily
outside its borders. Corporations should be governed by the
law of the states in which they operate; if the laws appear to
cause conflicting regulation, trans-jurisdictional (i.e.,
national or multi-national) corporations should create legally
separate subsidiaries to hold assets in different states, as
European corporations have long done.
Second, corporate boards should include board members
whose portfolio is specifically to represent the public and to
promote the interest of the public at large-understood as
citizens rather than shareholders, consumers or employeesand who are selected, directly or indirectly, by the public or
its representatives.
Third, the fiduciary duty of board members should be
clarified to be a duty to the corporation as a whole,
understood to include all the people whom it affects, and not
(as in the more extreme versions of the share-centered
ideology) as a mere duty to shares or fictional shareholders.
In order for this broader duty to function as something
more than a defense to shareholders' derivative actions, it
must be enforceable by someone other than representatives
of the shares-perhaps a public official, if staffing can be
found, or perhaps private attorneys general. The courts, no
note 59; Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Akhnai, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 309 (1997),
available at http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/pdf/Akhnai.pdf; Daniel
J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions:Investments, Memberships,
The Tree of Life and the Abortion Question, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 559 (1994),
available at http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/pdf/Dworkin.pdf.

No. 3:773]

ENRONITIS

doubt, will continue to emphasize good faith, procedural
safeguards and lack of direct personal conflicts of interest,
permitting boards great discretion under the business
judgment rule. Given the current leniency of judicial review
of board action, I do not think that the more amorphous
duties of a trustee for the corporation as polis would generate
radically different judicially imposed limitations on firm
behavior. Rather, its advantage is that it seems likely to put
a significantly different cast on the deliberations of directors
attempting to act in good faith, without much affecting those
who are not.
Finally, corporate intervention into the general political
debate ought to be restricted. As I have argued elsewhere,
corporations, particularly when they are governed in
accordance with the share value maximization model, are not
At a
legitimate participants in democratic debate. 2 '
minimum, direct corporate intervention into campaigns
should be restricted well beyond historical norms or the
limits of current Supreme Court doctrine.122 More broadly,
we need to find effective ways of limiting corporate lobbying
or placing it under the control of all the citizens concerned,
not merely managers and their purported beneficiaries the
fictional shareholders.
Indeed, the image of corporations as polis emphasizes
that in general corporations ought to be seen as on the state
side of the great liberal divide between state and society. We
need to be protected from them far more than they need
protection from our collective will. Current constitutional
law, which for over a century has granted corporations the
rights of citizens against governmental agencies, is precisely
backwards. Instead, citizens ought to have rights against
And we should be as
these government-like entities.
unrestrained in using other governmental entities to
regulate them as we are in using state law to regulate

12.
122

See generally, Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 38.
See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LoY. L.A.

L. REV. 1243 (1999) (describing election law's treatment of corporations).
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municipal corporations or federal law to regulate
administrative agencies.'2 3
Representing more defined corporate constituencies
inside the firm is a more difficult problem and I have only
preliminary thoughts on it. The model of the corporation I
have used, like the nexus of contracts model from which it
borrows, tends to blur the edges of the corporation: this firm
is anything but firm. Are consumers, or suppliers, or
municipal hosts, members of the corporate team or not? For
purposes of corporate governance, and in light of the
unexpected results likely from radical changes, I am inclined
to take the conservative position that such people, although
undoubtedly dependent on the firm and necessary for its
success, probably should be classified as members of the
public at large and represented as discussed above.
In contrast, employees who spend significant parts of
their waking lives working for and at the corporation must
have some form of representation in the corporate
governance structure if the team or polis concept is to be
anything other than yet another cynical tool to delude marks
into thinking they are being befriended rather than taken for
another ride. For all its problems, democracy remains a far
superior alternative to autocracy, kleptocracy or Enronitis.
In 1776 we rejected Parliament's claim to virtually represent
the American colonies. The claims of public corporations to
represent the public--or even the corporate team-while
granting the vote only to shares are even weaker.

2

See generally, Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note 55

(arguing, inter alia, that corporations are not citizens that require
protection from the state but rather state-like entities from which citizens
need to be protected); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on
CorporateActivity-Protectionsof Personal Rights from Invasion Through
Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 942-53 (1952) (arguing that the
state action doctrine does or should not apply to corporations: "The
emerging principle appears to be that the corporation, itself a creation of
the state, is as subject to constitutional limitations which limit action as is
the state itself").

